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Mission 
 
The mission of the Institute of the Protection and Security of the Citizen of the Joint Research 
Centre is to provide research-based, system-oriented support to EU policies so as to protect the 
citizen. The main application areas are cyber-security and the fight against fraud; natural, 
technological and economic risks; humanitarian security, non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards. 
The Institute will continue to maintain and develop its expertise in information, communication, 
space and engineering technologies in support of its mission. 
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 Executive Summary 
 
Vulnerability of the European electrical infrastructure appears to be growing due to several factors:  
 
• demand is always growing, and, although this growth may be forecast, it cannot be anytime 
easily faced; 
• transactions increase, following electrical system liberalisation, and this involves operating 
the whole infrastructure closer to the system capacity  and security limits; 
• an increased control systems complexity, required for secure system operation,  may in turn 
raise system vulnerability, due both to accidental faults and malicious attacks;  
• critical infrastructures, and the electrical system primarily,  are well known to be a 
privileged target in warfare, as well as terrorist attacks.  
 
In recent years, both Europe and America have experienced a significant number of huge blackouts, 
whose frequency and impact looks progressively growing. These events had common roots in the 
fact that current risk assessment methodologies and current system controls 1 appear to be no longer 
adequate. Beyond the growing complexity of the electrical system as a whole, two main reasons can 
be listed: 
• system analysis procedures based on these methodologies did not identify security threats 
emerging from failures of critical physical components; 
• on-line controls were not able to avoid system collapse. 
 
 This report provides a state-of-the-art of the technology on both regards: 
 
• as far as risk assessment methodologies are concerned, an overview of the conceptual power 
system reliability framework is provided, and the current N-1 principle for risk assessment 
in power systems is introduced, together with off-the-shelf enforcement methodologies, like 
optimal power flow. Emerging methodologies for dynamic security assessment are also 
discussed. The power system reliability approach is compared with the global approach to 
dependability introduced by computer scientists, and the conceptual clashes pointed out. 
Ways ahead to conciliate both views are outlined. 
 
• concerning power system controls, the report overviews the existing defense plans, making 
specific reference to the current Italian situation. The two major recent blackout events in 
the American North East and Italy are analysed, and the drawbacks of the existing 
arrangements and the installed control systems are discussed.  Emerging technologies, such 
as phasor measurement units and wide area protection are introduced. Their likely impact on 
the existing control room is discussed. Finally, potential cyber vulnerabilities of the new 
control systems are introduced, the role of communication standards in that context is 
discussed, and an overview of the current state of the art is presented. 
                                                 
1 by power system controls we mean here both the procedures for system management, and the related information and 
communication infrastructure, comprehensive of monitoring, actuation and protection devices. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1. What happened in the Summer of 2003? 
Summer 2003 was characterised by electricity supply disruption events which had wide impact on a 
number of key economies; these events contributed to direct attention on how crucially modern 
societies depend on correct operation of the electric power infrastructure. They also evidenced to 
what extent all technological infrastructures depend on electricity supply. On the other hand most 
interdependencies are not usually perceived not only by the public at large, but also by most 
infrastructure operators; hence they are not taken into appropriate account into the relevant 
contingency planning. 
In the current context, threats against the electrical system are growing – like for other network-
shaped, highly distributed infrastructures – due to two concurrent factors: 
 
• demand is always growing, and, although this growth may be forecast, it cannot be anytime 
easily faced (also because the public often contrasts construction of new power generating 
plants and transmission lines) [UCTE, 2004b, UCTE, 2004c]. Power systems have been 
developed in the past 50 years so as to ensure mutual assistance between national 
subsystems including common use of reserve capacities and, to some extent, to optimise the 
use of energy resources by allowing exchanges between these systems. Today’s market 
development with its high level of cross-border exchanges was out of the scope of the 
original system design. Transactions increase, following electrical system liberalisation, and 
this involves operating the whole infrastructure closer to security limits, see Section 2.1 
[Eurelectric, 2004];  
• market liberalisation involves that multiple operators exchange critical information so as to 
jointly operate the system, hence a number of key control systems need drastic reviews in 
order to fit  to operation in a market context. The electrical system depends substantially and 
increasingly from its supporting information and communication infrastructure, because 
almost all system vital functions are remotely controlled, so that an increased control 
systems complexity, required for secure system operation, may in turn raise system 
vulnerability, due both to accidental faults and malicious attacks. Critical infrastructures, 
and the electrical system primarily, are well known to be a privileged target in warfare, as 
well as terrorist attacks. Unless appropriate measures are taken, this risk will increase with 
the adoption of open and public information and communication infrastructures for 
automation support. 
 
These risk factors are increasing with progressive establishment of a European energy market:  .the 
summer 2003 blackouts are likely to be the first ones where inadequacy of the system controls was 
the key factor: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 8 
 
August 14, 2003 – American North East 
The event was triggered by a contact between a tree and a 345 kV line (these contacts are rather 
usual and their likelihood increases with power flow due to line sagging). The event was in a way  
induced and, above all, inappropriately managed because of some impending problems affecting 
the monitoring and control equipment.  Indeed, the state estimator used to get a picture of the 
current system state, was out of order for approximately 4 hours and was restarted a few minutes 
before the black-out (both due to human errors and to technical problems). Another fault to the 
SCADA server put the alarm management system out of operation and slowed down the entire 
SCADA functionality, affecting online data update in particular, hence making control room 
operators quite totally blind in front of the event [US-Canada, 2004].   
 
August 28, 2003 – UK, South London   
A combination of events led to an electricity power supply failure in south London that occurred at 
18.20 on 28 August. Following an alarm caused by low oil level in a shunt reactor, a transformer 
was disconnected from the distribution system, as the normal practice in this case. Unexpectedly, 
automatic protection equipment interpreted the change of power flows, due to the transformer 
disconnection, as a fault, and disconnected 410,000 customers, including parts of London 
Underground and Network Rail system. Power supply was recovered in half an hour (though the 
restoration of underground operation took longer for safety reasons). The cause of the incident was 
the incorrect rating of a protection relay, undiscovered by the extensive quality control and 
commissioning procedures [National Grid, 2003] .  
 
September, 23 2003 - Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark   
At 12.36 on Tuesday 23 September 2003 Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden experienced a 
comprehensive blackout. The power failure was primarily caused by a fault at a substation in 
Southern Sweden. During a situation with a number of interconnections and power lines in 
maintenance and four nuclear units out of operation, the electric system in Southern Sweden 
experienced the loss of a large nuclear unit. Approximately 5’ after a double bus-bar fault in a 
substation on the West coast disconnected four out of five 400 kV transmission lines. Increasing 
flows on the remaining lines and low voltage in Southern Sweden made protection relays to trip. 
Consequently Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark were completely disconnected from the 
Central after 90 seconds. The root cause of the incident was the combination of the initial loss of the 
large nuclear unit with the double bus-bar fault in the substation on the West coast, which drove the 
system beyond its security criteria (N-3 situation) [Elkraft, 2003]. 
 
September 28, 2003 – Italy 
The degradation of the Italian system and the causes of its long restoration are mostly due to either 
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inadequate or inappropriate behaviour of protection equipment. All three categories of   protection 
systems (critical section control, load relief equipment, load rejection equipment) failed for 
different reasons [AEEG, 2004]. It is also remarkable that 21 out of 52 power plants failed to 
compensate the lack of imported power, because most of them rejected load at about 49 hertz, well 
above the stated threshold of 47.5 hertz [ibidem]. The inappropriate, overcautious setting was likely 
due to power plant operators’ inclination to protect their assets from under-frequency operation.  
 
Key issues 
In summary, neither electrical system management nor operating procedures, nor system 
automation were revised so as to adequately cope with the liberalisation scenario: 
• regarding the Italian case, the UCTE report [2004] points out as an accident originated in 
Switzerland did require the timely intervention by the Italian operator to be adequately dealt 
with. However the Italian operator does not have direct visibility on the events that 
happened in other countries, and therefore had to be warned on the phone from the Swiss 
operator;  
• the American  system alike lacks a governing body  who may effectively coordinate 
operators activities. Although NERC, the US coordinating body, did advance a proposal to 
that effect [NERC, 1997], this met the opposition of several regional operators. Moreover 
malfunction of a critical software equipment (the state estimator), which were designed to 
act as a common reference for the operators, was a key factor after the triggering event, in 
that it deceived operators on the likely progression of the electrical situation and its 
criticality; 
• in the Italian case, restoration was further compounded by critical infrastructure 
interdependency. After two hours, the emergency supply to several vital information and 
communication equipment ceased to work, hence this equipment could no longer operate. 
This required to resort to a backup satellite facility for communication, and to manually 
operate all the remotely controlled equipment, thus making restoration far longer and more 
cumbersome [AEEG, 2004]; 
• in the American case, restoration was even longer and more cumbersome, due to the 
inherent complexity and the extension of the crisis, the plethora of actors involved, and 
inadequacies of  automation and support equipment [US-Canada, 2004]. 
A significant feature of the Italian case is that it clearly outlines how the two basic attributes of 
power service reliability, i.e. adequacy and security, could in some cases be somewhat contrasting. 
During the summer crisis of June 26, due to exceptional weather conditions, the Italian operator was 
unable to meet demand requirements (failure to provide an adequate service), while the September 
blackout scenario is one where the Italian system, crucially dependant from power imports, fails 
when this import is suddenly cut off due to a fault, thus showing a lack of overall security. The 
system operator was driven to crucially rely on imports for several reasons, among them pressure 
from public opinion after the summer crisis, thus operating the system closer to its capacity and 
security limits. Also, the deployment of the Italian crisis is largely due to premature tripping of 
protection relays, made to protect specific assets, like power plants, transformers, and lines: in that 
case, security in asset protection prevailed over adequacy, i.e. caused a total failure to meet demand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 10 
1.1 Open questions 
Market liberalisation and the creation of a single European market have changed the environment in 
which a secure electricity supply can be ensured. The European grid is hosting transit of 
commercial flows over long distances, driving system operators to become more and more inter-
dependent, while at the same time substantial commercial interests have appeared and the number 
of market actors has significantly increased. The major political question raised by recent power 
outages is whether liberalisation did also trigger a process of mismanagement of the electrical 
infrastructure whose final outcome is an increase in the frequency and severity of power outages. 
As pointed out by the authoritative Eurelectric report on Power Outages in 2003 “major power 
outages are viewed by consumers as a failure of the whole electricity industry, irrespective of the 
actual reasons and contributing factors (…) The power outage events may increase scepticism to 
liberalisation in citizens, and have already done so in some officials both at national and European 
levels” [Eurelectric, 2004b].  In summary, there is a drive towards integration of the European 
electricity market, huge opportunities for advanced ICT in this domain and a need to address new 
vulnerability issues. The main open questions appear to be threefold: 
 
Assessment of the socio-economic impact of blackouts2 
We do not have adequate ways to forecast and assess the socio-economic impact of long electricity 
crises. Different studies, mainly based on customers’ own evaluations, provide widely ranging 
estimates for the cost of an unsupplied kWh. Shorter outages for industrial customers are valued at 
highest levels (e.g. 1,000 €/kWh), while long outages (over 24 hours) are put by residential 
customers around 5€/kWh, and in some cases below 1€/kWh. But these estimations are to a great 
extent uncertain; partly due to a lack of objective approximation of actually incurred costs, and 
partly due to the difficulties of drawing an appropriate balance between including and excluding 
directly and indirectly associated damages (e.g. a longer outage of the London Underground due to 
safety considerations was a consequence of the otherwise short UK event) [Eurelectric, 2004b].  
While the US situation had been the subject of comprehensive studies by the NERC, fully reported 
for instance in [US-Canada, 2004],  which show that the US situation kept worsening in the last 10-
15 years, data about frequency, duration and gravity of blackouts are hard to compare in Europe. 
The UCTE integrated data only cover the period 2000-2004, which is definitely too short to assess 
whether 2003 blackouts were a symptom of a pending systemic crisis, or simply exceptional events. 
A study would be needed to compare data over an extended period of time, encompassing 
liberalization, in some key European areas, e.g. United Kingdom, Scandinavia, Spain, and Italy. 
 
Assessment of power system reliability 
As extensively discussed in the previous section, many incidents arise from a pattern where the 
initial fault of a power system is compounded by failure of monitoring equipment and/or incorrect 
tripping of automatic protection devices. The general industry practice for security assessment has 
been to use a deterministic approach [IEEE/CIGRE, 2004]: the power system is designed and 
operated to withstand a set of contingencies referred to as "normal contingencies" selected on the 
                                                 
2 In view of the scope of the Contract in between the JRC and the Expert, this first issue, mentioned here for sake of 
completeness, was not further investigated. The rest of the report deepens the other two issues. 
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basis that they have a significant likelihood of occurrence (. This is usually referred to as the N-1 
criterion because it examines the behaviour of an N-component grid on a systematic but single 
contingency basis, i.e. following the loss of any one of its major components (generator, line, 
transformer, ect.).  Load flow analysis is then applied to evaluate the resulting grid conditions and 
check for system limits violation. However, steady-state analysis fails to keep into account the 
impact of sudden disturbances and their induced transient-dynamic effect. Although innovative 
dynamic assessment techniques are available, these are not yet applied in the standard operators 
practice, as far as on-line operator support is concerned. Moreover, there is no holistic methodology 
for evaluating risks arising from power system failures and automation system together, so as to 
join physical power system risk assessment with testing/compliance control procedures for 
automation and protection equipment.  
 
 
 
Review of electrical system controls 
An electric system comprising interconnected power grids (regional, national and super-national) 
needs complex controls, intended as the procedures for system management, and the related 
information and communication infrastructure, comprehensive of monitoring, actuation and 
protection devices to ensure that the delivery of electrical power anywhere in the system meets 
certain specified criteria. Such infrastructure has grown together with the electrical system since the 
’50, and for most respects it did not go through a thorough revision after liberalisation, joint with 
the “pushing limits” policy induced by system limitations and constraints, so as to cope with the 
new security challenges. Electrical system controls appears to be no longer adequate because: 
• Some alarms are not displayed on the screen of the operators that would have to manage 
them, due to either jurisdictional issues (e.g. along frontiers, as in the Switzerland/Italy 
case), or inappropriate procedures, and also because critical apparatuses are not duplicated 
so as to remove the effects of their malfunction (North America). In addition, there is a lack 
of alarm processing system that enables to identify any initial triggering event. 
• In both cases the defense plan of the systems failed. Automatic protection devices were not 
able to avoid system collapse. Furthermore, in the Italian case, restoration was made long 
and cumbersome due to inadequacies of the supporting information and communication 
infrastructure, namely as far as emergency supply systems are concerned. 
There is a growing consensus about inadequacy of the European system controls: “The lack or 
inadequacy of communication, co-ordination and/or data exchange between system operators 
seems to have played a major role in the escalation of some of the examined events. In some cases, 
there was a lack of sense of urgency, so that the designed procedures were not applied. Binding 
rules for coordination among system operators both in normal operation and in other situations are 
desirable. These rules must take into account the new challenges imposed by the liberalisation and 
integration of the European markets (larger cross-border flows, appearance of commercial 
interests, etc.). Tools and means to intensify collection and availability of real-time data should be 
examined and established” [Eurelectric, 2004].  
TSOs in the UCTE area are still applying non-binding recommendations, which were developed 
before liberalisation (since 1999, a binding System Operation Agreement is in force between the 
NORDEL TSOs; requiring inter alia the currently valid security criteria to be observed in daily 
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operations) [ibidem]. In the aftermath of the 2003 blackouts, the UCTE started an articulated 
revision process of its Operation Handbook [UCTE, 2004c] which is founded on the regulatory 
agreements among continental Europe TSOs.. The North American operational procedures alike are 
being revised by the NERC [2004]. Once this revision is accomplished, the Information and 
Communication infrastructure shall inevitably go through a redesign and reimplementation process 
to cope with the new regulatory agreements and the new operational procedures involved. As this 
infrastructure is by its nature multi-jurisdictionary, the real challenge is how to design and 
implement such a substantial review, which will involve all the various private and state entities 
that participate in the operation of the electrical system. In most of the affected countries, e.g. the 
US and Italy, such process is partly already in progress so as to reflect changes in the regulatory 
agreements between neighbouring ISOs/TSOs, which will be reasonably subsumed by the 
regulating authorities.   
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2 Power System reliability and the associated methodological 
issues 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
The power system is a highly nonlinear system that operates in a constantly changing environment; 
loads, generator outputs and key operating parameters change continually. The system continually 
adjusts to small disturbances due to changing load conditions and keeps operating satisfactorily, 
but it must also withstand disturbances of a severe nature, like a line fault or the loss of a large 
generator. Large disturbances often lead to structural changes due to the isolation of the faulted 
elements: “A fault on a critical element followed by its isolation by protective relays will cause 
variations in power flows, network bus voltages, and machine rotor speeds; the voltage variations 
will actuate both generator and transmission network voltage regulators; the generator speed 
variations will actuate prime mover governors; and the voltage and frequency variations will affect 
the system loads to varying degrees depending on their individual characteristics” [IEEE/CIGRE, 
2004].   For certain severe disturbances, “interconnected systems may be intentionally split into two 
or more “islands” to preserve as much of the generation and load as possible. The actions of 
automatic controls and possibly human operators will eventually restore the system to normal 
state. On the other hand, if the system is unstable, it will result in a run-away or run-down 
situation” and ”lead to cascading outages and a shut-down of a major portion of the power 
system” [ibidem]. 
 
The issue of power system reliability and security, and its relationship with system stability, is 
debated since the 1920s, and there have been repeated attempts to establish a systematic approach to 
the matter by CIGRE and IEEE Task Forces, starting from the1950s until the recent deliberation 
issued by a joint Task Force (JTF) of the two bodies [IEEE/CIGRE, 2003, 2004]. In the fifth section 
of both these reports, the relationship between the concepts of power system reliability, security and 
stability is summarised as such: 
• “Reliability of a power system refers to the probability of its satisfactory operation over the 
long run. It denotes the ability to supply adequate electric service on a nearly continuous 
basis, with few interruptions over an extended time period. 
• Security of a power system refers to the degree of risk in its ability to survive imminent 
disturbances3 (contingencies) without interruption of customer service. It relates to 
robustness of the system to imminent disturbances and, hence, depends on the system 
operating condition as well as the contingent probability of disturbances. 
• Stability of a power system refers to the continuance of intact operation following a 
disturbance. It depends on the operating condition and the nature of the physical 
disturbance.” 
A summary description of how these terms have been defined and used in practice, extracted from  
[IEEE/CIGRE, 2003, 2004] is provided hereinafter. The reader should refer to the latter source for 
formal definitions of Reliability, Security and Stability.  
 
                                                 
3 The meaning of imminent here is impending rather than in prospect or overhanging. 
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Stability 
Both documents define Stability as “the ability of an electric power system, for a given initial 
operating condition, to regain a state of operating equilibrium after being subjected to a physical 
disturbance, with most system variables bounded so that practically the entire system remains 
intact.”  This definition is exhaustively motivated by the JTF: fundamental issues related to 
definitions of power system stability from a system-theoretic viewpoint are addressed, and a 
formulation of power system stability, based on general stability concepts from system theory is 
proposed: “An equilibrium set of a power system is stable if, when the initial state is in the given 
starting set, the system motion converges to the equilibrium set, and operating constraints are 
satisfied for all relevant variables along the entire trajectory.” [IEEE/CIGRE, 2004]. Based on this 
analytical framework, the JTF report provides analytical definitions of several types of stability 
including Lyapunov stability, input-output stability, stability of linear systems, and partial stability.  
Of these various types, “the Lyapunov stability …and asymptotic stability are the ones most 
applicable to power system nonlinear behaviour under large disturbances, while linear systems 
stability finds wide use in small signal stability analysis of power systems”. Although power system 
stability is a single problem, “the various forms of instabilities cannot be properly understood and 
dealt with by treating it as such. Because of high dimensionality and complexity of stability 
problems, it helps to make simplifying assumptions to analyze specific types of problems using an 
appropriate degree of detail of system representation and appropriate analytical techniques”. This 
is why classification is essential for practical analysis and resolution of power system stability 
problems. Thus the JTF proposes the following classification, where stability disturbances are 
classified according to physical nature, size and originating device or process:  
Short Term 
Small - Disturbance  
Angle Stability 
Transient  
Stability 
Large-
Disturbance 
Voltage Stability
Small-
Disturbance 
Voltage Stability
Short Term Long Term
Power System
Stability
Rotor Angle 
Stability 
Frequency 
Stability
Voltage  
Stability 
Long TermShort Term
 
 
Fig. 1.  Classification of Power System Stability 
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Rotor Angle Stability:  these perturbations happen when some synchronous generators of an 
interconnected power system loose synchronism after being subjected to a disturbance. In steady-
state conditions, there is equilibrium between the input mechanical torque and the output 
electromagnetic torque of each generator, and their speed remains constant. When this equilibrium 
is upset, the rotors of the machines accelerate or decelerate according to the laws of motion of a 
rotating body. An increasing angular shift between a faster machine and a slower one, results in the 
transfer of part of the load from the slow machine to the fast machine. This tends to reduce the 
speed difference and hence the angular separation: however,  the power-angle relationship is highly 
nonlinear, so that,  beyond a certain limit, an increase in angular shift does no longer result into  an 
increase in power transfer, and the angular shift is further increased.  Rotor angle stability events are 
short term phenomena. They are categorized as small-disturbance rotor angle stability phenomena 
when disturbances are sufficiently small that system equations can be linearised. (time frame of 10 
– 20 seconds) and large-disturbance rotor angle stability or transient stability phenomena, due to 
severe disturbances, and involving large excursions of generator rotor angles (time frame of 3 - 5  
seconds).  
 
Voltage Stability: a perturbation of voltage stability is a progressive fall or rise of voltages of some 
buses of the system, and depends on the ability to maintain/restore equilibrium between load 
demand and load supply from the power system. A possible outcome of voltage instability is an 
increase of load in an area, with maximum loadability being reached, or tripping of transmission 
lines and other elements by their protective systems leading to cascading outages (voltage collapse).  
A major factor contributing to voltage instability is the voltage drop that occurs when active and 
reactive power flow through inductive reactances of the transmission network; this limits the 
capability of the transmission network for power transfer and voltage support. Voltage stability is 
classified as small-disturbance voltage stability (when the system is able to maintain steady 
voltages when subjected to small perturbations such as incremental changes in system load) and 
large-disturbance (when  the system is able to restore steady voltages following large disturbances 
such as system faults, loss of generation, or circuit contingencies.) The time frame of interest for 
voltage stability problems may vary from a few seconds to tens of minutes.  
 
Frequency Stability: a perturbation of frequency stability is due to active power imbalance between 
generators and loads irrespective of network aspects within each connected area. It can be 
encountered after a major disturbance has resulted in islanding. Stability in this case is a question of 
whether or not each island will reach an acceptable state of operating equilibrium with minimal loss 
of load. Instability occurs in the form of sustained frequency swings leading to tripping of 
generating units and/or loads. Frequency stability problems are associated with inadequacies in 
equipment responses, poor coordination of control and protection equipment, or insufficient 
generation reserve. The characteristic times of the processes range from fraction of seconds, 
corresponding to the response of devices such as underfrequency load shedding and generator 
controls and protections, to several minutes, corresponding to the response of devices such as prime 
mover energy supply systems and load voltage regulators.  
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Reliability, Adequacy and Security 
According to the JTF “Reliability is the overall objective in power system design and operation. To 
be reliable the power system must be secure most of the time. To be secure the system must be 
stable but must also be secure against other contingencies that would not be classified as stability 
problems, e.g., damage to equipment such as an explosive failure of a cable, fall of transmission 
towers due to ice loading or sabotage. Also, a system may be stable following a contingency, yet 
insecure due to post-fault system conditions resulting in equipment overloads or voltage 
violations”.   NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) [1997] defines power system 
reliability as “the degree to which the performance of the elements of the system results in power 
being delivered to consumers within accepted standards and in the amount desired. The degree of 
reliability may be measured by the frequency, duration, and magnitude of adverse effects on 
consumer service”. 
The JTF further distinguishes between two basic aspects of reliability:  
• Adequacy: the ability to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the 
customer at all times, taking into account scheduled and unscheduled outages of system 
components.   
• Security: the ability to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short circuits or non-
anticipated loss of system components. 
  As adequacy refers to the overall capability of the system to perform its service, it is often seen 
mostly as a ‘static’ property of the system, as opposed to security, which has both a 'static' and a  
'dynamic' component [Bertoldi et al, 1999]. It must be noted that there is a trade-off between 
adequacy and security: the further the system is stretched so as to fulfill user demand, i.e. to be 
adequate, the closer it is pushed towards its security limits [ibidem]. Also according to the JTF: 
“security and stability are time-varying attributes.” To assess stability, and security, one must study 
the performance of the power system under a particular set of conditions. Reliability, on the other 
hand, “is a function of the time-average performance of the power system; it can only be judged by 
consideration of the system's behaviour over an appreciable period of time” [IEEE/CIGRE, 2003]. 
A further issue is the distinction between security and stability.  According to the JTF: “system 
security may be further distinguished from stability in terms of the resulting consequences. For 
example, two systems may both be stable with equal stability margins, but one may be relatively 
more secure because the consequences of instability are less severe.”  On this point, it is also worth 
noting that a more formal definition of security, based on satisfaction of a set of inequality 
constraints, is proposed by Dy Liacco [1968]. 
In summary, the relationship among the concepts pertaining power system reliability can be 
depicted as in Fig. 1 below: 
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Fig. 2. Reliability related concepts for Power Systems: Semantic Network 
 
It is also worth noting that, while Reliability, Adequacy, Security are largely used and well-defined 
terms in the power sector, and Stability is formally defined by [IEEE/CIGRE, 2004], Robustness is 
not, although it is widely used in the power sector literature more or less synonymously with  
Security. 
 
2.2 Security Assessment 
As implied by the conceptual framework laid down in the previous section, security assessment 
requires studying the behaviour of the power system under impending disturbance. There are two 
important components of security assessment:  
• Static security assessment: a steady-state analysis of post-disturbance system conditions to 
verify that a new equilibrium point can be reached where no equipment ratings (e.g. current 
limits) and voltage constraints are violated.  
• Dynamic security assessment:  analysis of the different categories of system stability 
discussed in section 2.1, typically carried out through time domain simulations of system 
responses to small and/or large credible contingencies. 
Hence security assessment is based on static/dynamic system simulation, with diverse models and 
granularity of representation.  
Static Security assessment is concerned with evaluating voltage limits, thermal overloads, and 
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generator capability limits. It usually consists in systematic verification of N-1 contingencies, and is 
limited to steady-state analyses. Methods and tools to assess static security, i.e. system adequacy, 
are since long-time in operational use, see for instance [Stott et al., 1987].  We must therefore argue 
that adequacy is operationally defined, in that static security of a power system can be computed 
through a simple, steady-state model, and rather straightforward computational techniques.  
However, network models and particularly which way to model external networks is still an open 
problem. This is a key issue in order to assess the impact of trans-national transactions on the 
security of a national grid.4 In this context it is also of high relevance the problem of data sharing 
between TSOs, according to common simulation models and in the respect of the privacy 
requirements related to market liberalization. 
As anticipated in the introduction, market liberalization is pushing towards an increase of 
exchanges, both across national borders and within each specific national market. Moreover, these 
exchanges become much more hectic and difficult to forecast in advance, which makes Security 
Assessment a key issue nowadays [Bertoldi et al., 1999], [La Scala, 2003]. In that respect, 
Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) may become a substantial complement to static analysis, in 
presence of high power flows and increased risk of dynamic instabilities. However DSA crucially 
depends on the accuracy of the underlying model, which confirms the importance of data sharing 
between TSOs. DSA includes Transient Stability Assessment and Dynamic Voltage Stability 
Assessment: in both cases, analytic complexity (high dimensions, highly non-linear problem) may 
lead to combinatorial explosion (operating conditions & contingencies). As problem features 
typically include huge data quantity, filtering and severity ranking is performed by using qualitative 
and quantitative information, included operators expertise, which may involve use of Artificial 
Intelligence techniques [Denegri et al., 2003] [AIA, 2003]. According to Bertoldi et al., [1999], 
ranking criteria may be of an economic, probabilistic, and empiric nature, e.g.: 
• contingency likelihood, independent from its effects; 
• contingency severity, in terms of associated dynamic behaviour, topological modifications, 
and acceptability of  the post-event operating condition; 
•  a combination of the above criteria, so as to rank contingencies both with respect to 
impending danger, and likelihood of the event. 
• an overall vulnerability index, depending on (1) sensitivity to operational parameters (2) 
security after the first contingency until an equilibrium point is reached and (3) difficulty of 
the subsequent restoration process. 
As earlier approaches to Dynamic Security Assessment date back to the sixties, the technology is 
now rather ripe for off-line operational application, while current R&D concerns integration with 
supervisory equipment, so as to provide on-line decision support to operators. However, the 
intricacies of modelling a huge non-linear system, and the complex computational procedures 
involved, make dynamic security assessment rather an articulate, well-approximated guess about 
system security, than an effective method to operationally compute dynamic security. 
 
2.3 Power system vs. Computer Systems Dependability 
Dependability of computer systems had been a concern since the foundations of this technology 
[Avizˇienis et al., 2001].   Computer Science views dependability as a global concept, 
encompassing such properties as: 
                                                 
4 The fact that there are few attempts to cope with the problem on a continental scale is quite telling. 
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• availability: readiness for correct service 
• reliability: continuity of correct service 
• safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment 
• confidentiality: absence of unauthorized disclosure of information 
• integrity: absence of improper system state alterations 
• maintainability: ability to undergo repairs and modifications 
Several other dependability attributes have been defined that are either combinations or 
specializations. For instance, security is defined as the concurrent existence of: 
• availability for authorized users only  
• confidentiality 
• integrity  
The widespread use of information and communication technologies made the above terminology 
accepted in many sectors of industry, starting from the safety critical ones: automotive, aerospace, 
railways, ships etc., so that it may be considered as a global concept nowadays in Control System 
engineering, where  dependability requirements are the “required goals of the application system in 
terms of the acceptable frequency and severity of the failure modes, and of the corresponding 
acceptable outage durations (when relevant), for a stated set of faults, in a stated environment” 
[ibidem].  
Based on this conceptual framework, several methodologies have been introduced to master the life 
cycle of control systems for the power system: 
• quasi-formal methodologies like UML [1997-2004]; 
• rigorous design methodologies based on the Petri nets concept [Reisig, 1985], like 
Superimposed Automata, whose application was pioneered in the power sector [Ciapessoni 
et al., 2001]; 
• formal requirement specification and verification & validation methods based on logical 
languages [Heitmeyer and Mandrioli, 1996], like the TRIO temporal logic language 
experimented in the power sector by Ciapessoni et al., [1998]. 
Unfortunately, the conceptual framework from Computer Science was not accepted in the power 
sector, where a different perspective emerged long before introduction of computer systems into 
practical application, and was eventually established in the late nineties, as discussed in Section 2.1. 
This is especially confusing for control system engineers in the power sector, as they must get 
accustomed to switch between different terminologies, according to the specific subject and 
audience of their talk. 
In summary, the common terms in both terminologies are: 
• Reliability: continuity of correct service. There is no clash between the two definitions. 
• Security: there is a substantially different, uncorrelated meaning of this term in the two 
disciplines. This results from the original formulation of  Security in Computer Science by 
Laprie [1992]  as “dependability with respect to the prevention of unauthorised access 
and/or handling of information”, while Power System security, as discussed, is “the ability 
to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short circuits or non-anticipated loss of 
system components”  [IEEE/CIGRE, 2004]. Although these definitions are deeply different, 
it is perhaps possible to envisage a broader definition which may encompass both concepts, 
see next section. 
Moreover, dependability is a formally defined concept in Computer Science, while has no formal 
meaning in Power Systems Engineering, although some authors in this latter discipline take 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 21 
dependability as a synonymous of reliability.  
The practical consequence of  these different conceptions of reliability in Power Systems and 
Computer Science, or  rather, in Control Systems engineering, is that there exist no holistic 
approach to risk assessment in power systems, able to evaluate the impact of control system failures 
aside physical components’ ones. “Devices used to protect individual equipment may respond to 
variations in system variables and cause tripping of the equipment, thereby weakening the system 
and possibly leading to system instability”, IEEE/CIGRE, [2004] thus making automated protection 
equipment a key vulnerability factor in power systems. Also, as discussed in the introduction, 
failure of monitoring and supervisory equipment was a key factor, perhaps the main background 
cause for most recent power system outages.  
 
2.4 Towards a holistic approach 
There are recent attempts to reconcile the power system view to the global one. Holmgren et al. 
[2001] by the Swedish Defence Research Agency propose the following definitions:  
• Vulnerability: the property of an infrastructure system that limits its ability to endure threats 
and survive accidental events that originates both within and outside the system’s 
boundaries 
• Robustness: a system’s ability to endure threats and survive accidental events that originate 
both within and outside the system’s boundaries, and if disturbed, return to a state where the 
operating characteristics correspond to the assigned function 
• Reliability: the ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environmental 
and operational conditions and for a given period of time Risk: a combination of the 
probability/likelihood for an accident to occur and the resulting negative consequences if the 
accident occurs 
• Safety: the complement of the risk concept 
In the main, this approach is seemingly closer to the global approach to dependability, but does not 
really pretend to integrate the classical Power System approach. Rather, an attempt is made to 
establish risk analysis on a sociological base. 
 
A unifying view might be through the recently proposed SQRA concept to define properties of a 
power system as a service infrastructure [Samotyi, 2003]. This approach defines: 
• Security of power delivery and market systems as  a measure of system vulnerability to 
natural events, human error, and intentional attack; 
• Quality of power supplied as a measure of electric supply characteristic that can impact the 
performance of digital systems; 
• Reliability of power supplied as  the number of failure events and the amount of time the 
system is unavailable in a given year; 
• Availability of affordable energy services as the average time per year the system is in 
service and is satisfactorily performing its intended function. 
These definitions appear consistent with the Computer Science approach, although there is no 
explicit attempt to bridge the gap with the classical Power System view. 
Al-Kuwaity and Kiriakopoulos [2004] provide a critical comparison of dependability related 
concepts in network systems and build on existing literature to provide operational definitions of 
five defining concepts: Dependability, Survivability, Fault-Tolerance, Reliability, and Security. 
Although the ample bibliography surveyed does not include references from the power sector, these 
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definitions appear to be applicable to power systems as well. Specifically, their definition of 
Security as the “ability to protect against undesirable events and preserve confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability”,  which appears broad enough to encompass Computer Science and Power System 
views, is taken from  a paper by Barbacci et al., [2002]. What makes both works especially 
interesting is the taxonomy by Barbacci quoted at page 38 of the former paper: 
 
 
  
 
This is especially relevant to our discussion, because it allows to position Power System synthesis 
and analysis methods (like Optimal Power Flow and Dynamic Security Assessment) aside to the 
above referred methods for Control System synthesis and analysis, like UML and Petri nets, and 
emerging methodologies for Information and Communication systems security assessment.  
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3 Review of power system controls  
 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the Introduction to this report, the blackout events of Summer 2003 have pointed 
out the inadequacy of power system controls (intended in the threefold meaning of operating 
procedures for interaction among stakeholders, manual control and automatic control). As this 
inadequacy is quite patent to operators, the blackouts have triggered a hastened review of the whole 
control system, which may in turn bring about new vulnerabilities. 
To analyse this process in detail, we need first to overview briefly the current state of power system 
controls, so as to point out specific inadequacies highlighted by the blackout events. To do so, we 
will focus first on a basic principle of power system control, primary and backup relying, and 
provide later an introduction to power system defense plans, taking the Italian situation as a 
paradigm. This overview does neither pretend to be comprehensive nor detailed (a comprehensive, 
detailed analysis of the current state of the art of power system controls would probably require 
several books). The key to this overview is rather to provide the minimum background information 
needed to understand the reasons for the two major blackouts of 2003, the American North East and 
the Italian one. The central section of this part of the report provides an analysis of these two 
blackout events. 
Then we introduce the emerging technologies in the power system control sector, Special Protection 
Systems, Wide Area Measurement, and Adaptive Protection. Although these technologies started to 
be introduced in the mid eighties, they are not yet fully mature. Moreover, their integration within 
the existing legacy control system is on the frontier of current research in the sector. We will show 
how this integration is very demanding, to the point of leaving a number of basic issues unsolved: 
1) To which extent future control systems can be automated? Although most control decision 
need to be automated, due to the strict real time requirement, yet the system must retain 
enough flexibility, which requires keeping humans in the loop. 
2) Which way will the operator of the control room of the future supervise the power system?  
As current technologies permit to integrate more functions (operational supervision, 
administrative and business functions etc.), which way will we manage this integration, and 
which way will the system be operated? 
3) The complexity of the new technologies, which are highly ICT intensive, may bring about 
new vulnerabilities. Which way to master this complexity? 
 
3.2 Background on power systems controls 
Primary and backup relaying  
 
Protection against short circuits is achieved by two groups of relaying equipment: primary  relaying 
and back-up relaying. Primary relaying is the first line of defense, whereas back-up relaying works 
only when primary relaying fails. Back-up relaying is employed only for protection against short 
circuits. These are the preponderant type of power failure, hence short primary relaying is more 
likely to fail than other protections, due to several reasons (current or voltage supply to the relays, 
protective relays, tripping circuit or breaker mechanism, etc.).The main design principles for 
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primary and backup relaying in protection systems are the following [Russell Mason]: 
1. Circuit breakers are located in such a way as  to disconnect only one faulty element.  
2. A separate zone of protection is established around each system element. Any failure 
occurring within a given zone will cause the tripping of all and only the circuit breakers 
within that zone. 
3. For failures within the region where two adjacent protective zones overlap, more breakers 
will be tripped than the minimum necessary. In fact, if there were no overlap, a failure in a 
region between zones would not lie in either zone, and therefore no breakers would be 
tripped. 
‘Back-up relaying is located so that anything that might cause primary relaying to fail will not 
cause failure of back-up relaying as well, i.e. so as not to employ or control anything in common 
with the primary relays that are to be backed up. So far as possible, the practice is to locate the 
back-up relays at a different station. Consider, for example, the back-up relaying for breaker b2 on 
the transmission line L1 of Fig. 2. Its back-up relays are normally arranged to trip breakers b4 and 
b6. Should breaker b2 fail to trip for a fault on the line L1, breakers b4 and b6 are tripped; 
breakers b4 and b6 and their associated back-up equipment, being physically apart from the 
equipment that has failed, are not likely to be simultaneously affected as might be the case if 
breakers b3 and b5 were chosen instead’  
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The back-up relays at locations b1, b4, and b6 provide back-up protection if bus faults occur at 
station S. Also, the back-up relays at b1 and b4 provide back-up protection for faults in the line L3. 
In other words, the zone of protection of back-up relaying extends in one direction from the location 
of any back-up relay and at least overlaps each adjacent system element. 
When back-up relaying functions, a larger part of the system is disconnected than when primary 
relaying operates correctly. This is inevitable if back-up relaying is to be made independent of 
those factors that might cause primary relaying to fail. Moreover, back-up relying must operate 
with sufficient time delay so that primary relaying will be given enough time to function. In other 
words, when a short circuit occurs, both primary relaying and back-up relaying will normally start 
to operate, but primary relaying is expected to trip the necessary breakers to remove the short-
circuited element from the system, and back-up relaying will then reset without having had time to 
complete its function. When a given set of relays provides back-up protection for several adjacent 
system elements, the slowest primary relaying of any of those adjacent elements will determine the 
necessary time delay of the given back-up relays’. [ibidem]. 
 
Distance relays are adjusted on the basis of the impedance between the relay location and the fault 
location. The first, high-speed, zone of distance relays is adjusted in such a way as to reach to 80% 
to 90% of the length of a two-ended line. The overall fault clearing time of a distance protection 
depends on: 
1. the time required to measure the impedance;  
2. the time needed to issue the command to the breaker;  
3. the opening time of the breaker;    
4. the residual arcing time, 
and amounts to 40-50 msec. in state-of-the-art equipment. 
The purpose of the second-zone unit of a distance relay is to provide protection for the rest of the 
line beyond the reach of the first-zone unit. It is adjusted to operate even for arcing faults at the end 
of the line. To do this, the unit must reach beyond the end of the line. It to try to have the second-
zone unit reach is customary to reach at least 20% of an adjoining line section.. This second-zone 
time is normally about 0.2 second to 0.5 second. 
 
 
The third-zone unit provides back-up protection for faults in adjoining line sections. So far as 
possible, its reach should extend beyond the end of the longest adjoining line section under the 
conditions that cause the maximum amount of underreach. The third zone time delay is usually 
about 0.4 second to 1.0 second. 5 
                                                 
5 Most distance protections are equipped with power swing blocking relays. These disable protection trip for stable 
oscillatory overloads while enable it when the area is getting out of step with respect to neighbouring areas (this latter 
function is activated for distance protection over lines connecting different areas). 
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As noted in chapter 2.1, there is a trade-off between adequacy and security of a power system. This 
conflicting set of objectives also applies to protection systems, where [Sidhu and Rosas, 2003]: 
• adequacy6 is a measure of the protection system to perform properly in removing system 
faults; 
• security is a measure of the protection tendency in not initiating an incorrect trip action. 
Security may be enhanced, for instance, by utilising redundant relays, and issuing the trip command 
when any of the relays detects a fault. This trade-off has an economic facet as well: to ensure the 
security of asset protection systems – either for transmission lines or power generators – means to 
adjust relays for ensuring their operation when the security of the asset is menaced by an over-
current or by a low rotating speed, respectively. This objective may conflict with ensuring an 
adequate power service. An over-cautious protection setting may cause, for instance, distance 
protections to trip in the third zone when the current, although high, does not correspond to short 
circuit in neighbouring lines yet. This is what happened in most blackouts, and namely in the 
American Northeast - August 2003, and the Italian one in September, as discussed in the next 
chapter 3.3. 
 
 
Defense Plans 
 
All control actions (both manual and automated) to prevent a power system to pass from a normal 
condition to an emergency condition, or to restore it into a normal condition from an emergency 
condition, are usually defined as Defense Plans. Manual control actions in response to a complex 
event, which usually generates a large number of alarms, require at least 10’ to be operated. When 
response times need to be shorter, automated control devices are required. These may be either 
local, like most protection systems, or involve a more complex logic. 
To provide a brief overview of current defense plans, from now on we will focus on the ones in use 
on the Italian system [GRTN, 2000]. In view to provide insights about their vulnerabilities, this is a 
reasonable choice to fix ideas, as the Italian system is one of the most stressed, due to its overall 
imbalance, caused by its high dependency on power imports from neighbouring regions and its 
antenna-like structure. 
 
 
 
Critical Section Control  
A critical section is defined as a set of 380 kV lines whose loss would result into separation of a 
portion of the grid. Critical section control is meant to avoid separation by detaching some load 
after a number of lines have been eventually opened by the relevant line protection. The load 
detached by critical section control is the minimum required to avoid separation of a portion of the 
grid and the subsequent triggering of the Automated Load Shedding Plan described in the following 
section. 
Critical section control is operated by the EDA automated detachment system. The input signals to 
this system are:  
                                                 
6 The authors actually use the term dependability  instead of  adequacy which further testifies the terminology maze in 
the sector. 
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• the breaker state on each line (this signals whether the line is operational), 
• whether active power through that line did trespass a lower threshold, 
• whether active power did trespass a higher threshold on that same line, 
• whether the line protection did operate. 
The triggering conditions for the main control logic of the EDA are: 
• two lines of the critical section are out of service and the higher threshold was trespassed on 
a single line currently operational, 
• three lines are out of service and the lower threshold was trespassed on a single line in 
operation. 
One second after one of these conditions becomes true, the EDA sends a remote control signal to 
the emergency load detachment banks.  
Although this logic is very simple, the thresholds were set after studying the grid behaviour both in 
static and dynamic conditions under several different grid set ups and several different power 
import conditions. Basically, critical section control has to ensure that: 
• Line overload shall not go beyond 140% the security limit for any 220 and 380 kV. 
• Voltage on any line shall not go below prefixed limits, and the grid shall not be affected by 
an unstable behaviour.  
• Any line protection shall not be triggered due to the dynamic behaviour of the grid after 
EDAs’intervention. 
The currently operational EDA systems regard: 
• Control of  the critical section on the critical section embracing all Italian northern borders 
Control of  France-Italy connections 
• Control of the critical section between Northern Italy and Central Italy  
• Control of the critical section between continental Italy and Sicily 
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Fig 3 – Italian grid’s critical sections. 
 
 
Load Shedding  
When two areas of the grid get separated, the area importing energy has not enough generating 
capability so that its frequency slows down, and the area quickly collapses.  The Load Shedding 
plan is to avoid that frequency gets below a value which is considered to endanger power generating 
plants. In the Italian system this value is specifically set to 47.5 Hz, according to UCTE provisions 
[UCTE, 2003].  When frequency remains below 47.5 Hz for 4”, thermal power production plants 
are allowed to separate from the grid (‘Load rejection’).  
The load shedding plan results into detachment of a load amount depending on frequency value and 
its derivative. For ordinary loads, frequency thresholds are set between 49.6 e 49.0 Hz, and 
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frequency derivative thresholds are set between 0.2 e 0.5 Hz/sec. For pumps frequency thresholds 
are set between 49,1 e 47,7 Hz, and frequency derivative thresholds between 0,05 and 0,50 Hz/sec.  
An appropriate combination of these thresholds results into shedding of 3-5% of the total load 
amount for each shedding step. The overall amount of load to be shed is 70% of the total. Load 
shedding relays have frequency activation threshold at 49.1 Hz. Load shedding is operated on the 
MV distribution grid but: this allows selecting loads to be detached, while this would be impossible 
on the transmission grid. The system goal is to shed 60% of the total load, a further 10% is added 
up to take into account unavailability and malfunctions of the load shedding relays and the breakers 
operated by the system. 
As discussed, when frequency goes below 47.5 Hz, all thermal power plants would automatically 
reject load, and the whole system would collapse. To avoid a generalized blackout, a few small 
power generating station close to broad cities get separated from the grid together with the 
neighbouring grid serving that city. 
 
In some grid areas, the collapse of a single line may result into power generation capacity exceeding 
demand. In case the power plant is not equipped with an automatic regulatory control system, the 
power generating group must be remotely controlled so as to reduce load. To avoid economic losses 
in large power stations, a few generating groups are equipped with event based load rejection 
systems. These are activated in case one or more lines are lost.  This strategy can be implemented 
either by remote activation, or by appropriate manual set-up of the automated plant control systems. 
 
 
 
Manual Defense Plans 
When the power system is affected by slow dynamic phenomena (see Section 2.1), mostly related to 
voltage degradation, power system operators may manually operate the system by blocking 
transformers tap changing towards power distribution and by selectively detaching loads via the 
Emergency Operating Console (this latest manoeuvre is operated when all other corrective actions 
at a local and national level could not withstand the voltage collapse trend). 
Automatic tap changing in 380/150-132 kV and 220/150-132 kV autotransformers and AT/MT 
transformers allows continuous regulation of secondary voltage levels. This is usually operated 
through an automatic control, but may be also manually operated by the plant operator. This is done 
either in accordance to a daily plan agreed between the ISO/TSO and the plant operator or under 
direct command by the ISO/TSO. When there is slow voltage degradation, the system operator may 
impose total or partial blocking of transformer tap changing, in order to avoid that automatic 
regulatory control results in further voltage degradation in the 380/220 kV transmission grid. 
The ISO/TSO operating control centres are equipped with Emergency Operating Consoles that are 
to manually operate load detachment by selectively graduating its amount and location. These 
Consoles are load detachment matrices composed by 30 push-buttons (6 groups of 5 push-buttons) 
plus 5 overall area push-buttons operating 5 individual push-buttons. While the individual push-
buttons are to detach load on a rather small district, area push-buttons operate load detachment on a 
large region. 
In exceptional cases, a large portion of the electric grid may be affected by a long term generation 
inadequacy. In those cases the ISO/TSO resorts to a plan to cyclically partition load detachment 
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(PESSE, Italian acronym for Electric System Emergency Security Plan). 
To this aim the HV power grid is provided with ad-hoc equipment to partly automate these load 
detachment manoeuvres. 
The Plan is executed by distribution companies in accordance with ISO/TSO instructions. 
Distribution companies are to define the Plan as far as their customers are involved, and must 
establish the ways, the amount and the localization of load detachment, the relevant timetable and 
all manoeuvres in order to operate load detachment and return to normal operating conditions. 
When power generation inadequacy may be forecast a few hours in advance, the Plan involves 
execution of a selective programme to dilute load detachment on a large number of end-users, so as 
to by-pass automatic response of the equipment. When the emergency condition cannot be forecast, 
this Plan may be operated soon after equipment automatic response, so as to dilute the impact on a 
wider number of end-users. Households are mostly involved during daylight, while impact on large 
power consumers, like process industry and manufacturing is delayed until 16 to 20-22 in the 
evening.  
 
 
3.3 Focus on the blackouts 
This section provides a comparative analysis of two major recent blackouts, The American North 
East blackout (August 14, 2003), and the Italian blackout (September 27-28, 2004). These events 
were by far the largest in the current century, had profound and lasting impact on the public, and are 
one main motivation for this study.  A comprehensive and authoritative overview of most recent 
blackouts is provided by the Eurelectric Task Force on Power Outages [Eurelectric, 2004]. The 
reader may also refer to a previous JRC report [Stefanini, 2005] to find more details on these events 
as well as on other recent blackouts in Europe.  
 
 
The American North East blackout  
 
The Eastern part of the US grids supplies about 2/3 of US consumers. The market is open to retail 
competition. The grid is inadequate to the competition regimen, because it was designed long time 
ago – no hint of  a competitive market.  In the area where the NE blackout started, basically the US 
portion of the Great Lakes basin, there are several transmission system operators, 3 of them in the 
Ohio state only. 50 Million people were affected. Blackout lasted 1 day in New York and 2 in 
Detroit. Hence the situation basically matches the Italian one in terms of figures, although 
restoration was quicker in Italy. 
The final report of the joint ad-hoc US-Canada investigation committee on the blackout [US-
Canada 2004] evidenced the following groups of causes for the event: 
 
The Ohio phase of the August 14, 2003, blackout was caused by deficiencies in specific practices, 
equipment, and human decisions by various organizations that affected conditions and outcomes 
that afternoon—for example, insufficient reactive power was an issue in the blackout, but it was not 
a cause in itself. Rather, deficiencies in corporate policies, lack of adherence to industry policies, 
and inadequate management of reactive power and voltage caused the blackout, rather than the lack 
of reactive power. There are four groups of causes for the blackout: 
Group 1: FirstEnergy and ECAR failed to assess and understand the inadequacies of FE’s system, 
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particularly with respect to voltage instability and the vulnerability of the Cleveland-Akron area, 
and FE did not operate its system with appropriate voltage criteria. (Note: This cause was not 
identified in the Task Force’s Interim Report. It is based on analysis completed by the investigative 
team after the publication of the Interim Report.) 
A) FE failed to conduct rigorous long-term planning studies of its system, and neglected to 
conduct appropriate multiple contingency or extreme condition assessments.  
B) FE did not conduct sufficient voltage analyses for its Ohio control area and used operational 
voltage criteria that did not reflect actual voltage stability conditions and needs.  
C) ECAR (FE’s reliability council) did not conduct an independent review or analysis of FE’s 
voltage criteria and operating needs, thereby allowing FE to use inadequate practices without 
correction.  
D)Some of NERC’s planning and operational requirements and standards were sufficiently 
ambiguous that FE could interpret them to include practices that were inadequate for reliable 
system operation.  
Group 2: Inadequate situational awareness at FirstEnergy. FE did not recognize or understand the 
deteriorating condition of its system. 
A) FE failed to ensure the security of its transmission system after significant unforeseen 
contingencies because it did not use an effective contingency analysis capability on a routine basis.  
B) FE lacked procedures to ensure that its operators were continually aware of the functional state 
of their critical monitoring tools.  
C) FE control center computer support staff and operations staff did not have effective internal 
communications procedures.  
D) FE lacked procedures to test effectively the functional state of its monitoring tools after repairs 
were made.  
E) FE did not have additional or back-up monitoring tools to understand or visualize the status of 
their transmission system to facilitate its operators’ understanding of transmission system 
conditions after the failure of their primary monitoring/alarming systems.  
Group 3: FE failed to manage adequately tree growth in its transmission rights-of-way. 
This failure was the common cause of the outage of three FE 345-kV transmission lines and one 
138-kV line.  
Group 4: Failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organizations to provide effective real-time 
diagnostic support. 
A) MISO did not have real-time data from Dayton Power and Light’s Stuart-Atlanta 345-kV line 
incorporated into its state estimator (a system monitoring tool). This precluded MISO from 
becoming aware of FE’s system problems earlier and providing diagnostic assistance or direction to 
FE.  
B) MISO’s reliability coordinators were using non-real-time data to support real-time “flowgate” 
monitoring. This prevented MISO from detecting an N-1 security violation in FE’s system and from 
assisting FE in necessaryì relief actions.  
C) MISO lacked an effective way to identify the location and significance of transmission line 
breaker operations reported by their Energy Management System (EMS). Such information would 
have enabled MISO operators to become aware earlier of important line outages. 
D) PJM and MISO lacked joint procedures or guidelines on when and how to coordinate a security 
limit violation observed by one of them in the other’s area due to a contingency near their common 
boundary. 
Source:  US-Canada [2004] 
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The US situation was an N-2, perhaps an N-3 one, i.e. three major failures had to happen prior to 
system collapse. When the first line, Stuart-Atlanta, tripped at 14:02, the other surrounding ones 
had to bear the additional load. The second failure (Chamberlin-Harding) happened one hour after 
the first; the third (Hanna-Juniper) after another half an hour. Hence there was plenty of time to 
counteract the contingencies. Then the collapse was rather sudden. Blackout actually started at 
16:06, about half an hour after the third event. By 16:10 the whole lake region was affected. New 
York was hit at 16:13.  
When the cascade of events was started, a number of concurrent issues have to be pointed out: 
• protections systems proved to be inadequate: about 70% did not work properly; 
• inadequate or faulty SCADA and EMS: First Energy lost its alarm processing system until a 
few minutes before the first event. Awhile the other neighbouring operator, MISO had an 
independent software problem; 
• there was insufficient reactive power support and operators were unable to counteract; 
• system operators (PJM, MISO, etc.)  need to coordinate their defense plans; 
• planning studies are insufficient; 
In summary, the numerous causes and contributing factors can be grouped into four categories: 
1. inadequate management of tree growth in transmission rights-of-way 
2. inadequate situational awareness  
3. inadequate diagnostic support 
4. inadequate system understanding 
Apart from the triggering event, due to 1, the whole deployment of the crisis is almost entirely due 
to concurrent unreported failures both of  FE’s supervisory system and of the diagnostic equipment 
(the state estimator) available at MISO, the regional TSO. In turn, this was the main cause for the 
inadequate situational awareness at First Energy and MISO. Failure to provide backup to this 
equipment can hardly be understood in the context of such a complex and hazardous supervisory 
task – when compared with security standards applied in the energy sector in Europe and to other 
safety critical processes almost everywhere. 
 
The Italian blackout  
Starting at  3:01 on the night of  September 28, an event originated in Switzerland resulted into a 
blackout which affected the whole of  Italy except Sardinia. Italy was importing about a quarter of 
the domestic consumption (including big pumped storage plants) through fifteen transmission lines 
from France, Switzerland, Slovenia and Austria, when a main line in Switzerland through the 
Lukmanier pass, tripped due to a tree flashover. After re-connection failed, failing to recognise the 
overloading of the remaining lines, the Swiss grid operator called the Italian operator for a 300 
MW decrease in import.. In twenty four minutes, a second Swiss line through the S.Bernardino pass 
tripped, initiating a cascade tripping of all transmission lines along the Italian border. In two and a 
half minutes, Italy went into a total blackout. 
The event took place on Saturday night, when nearly all productive activities were at rest, thus 
resulting into limited impact on the population and the economy. Nevertheless energy restoration 
required from 3 to 19 hours, 3-4 hours for the northern of Italy  up to 19 hours  for Sicily. However, 
as the blackout took place on a Saturday night, in addition to limiting direct damage, also made 
event management simpler by guaranteeing high mobility of event management  and rescue teams. 
On both respects, a blackout during a working day might result into a completely different scenario. 
Nevertheless, it was the largest blackout in Europe since ever, at least in peace times, comparable in 
size with the American North East event (about 170,000 versus 350,000 MWh estimated energy not 
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supplied; 50 million people involved). 
Immediately after the blackout, transmission system operators’ executives of the five involved 
countries decided to set up an independent UCTE Investigation Committee that was given the 
mission to bring a transparent and complete explanation of the blackout to the national and 
European Authorities and to the general community.  The Committee conclusions are summarised 
below: 
The Committee identified four main reasons for the fact that things did not go as foreseen: 
1. Unsuccessful re-closing of a first line in Switzerland (Lukmanier) because of a too high phase 
angle difference 
Due to the high loads on the remaining lines, an automatic device, aiming at protecting the 
equipment, blocked according to its design settings the possibility of restoring the line back into 
service. 
2. Lacking a sense of urgency regarding the overload of a second line connecting the Swiss 
system to Italy (San Bernardino) and call for inadequate countermeasures in Italy  
The operators were unaware of the fact that the overload was only allowable for about 15 minutes. 
A single phone call by ETRANS took place 10 minutes after the trip of the first line. ETRANS 
asked for the imports to be decreased by 300 MW. This measure was completed by GRTN within 
10 more minutes. Even together with the Swiss internal countermeasures, it was insufficient to 
relieve the overloads. 
3. Angle instability and voltage collapse in Italy  
This was the reason why the Italian system collapsed after its separation from the UCTE system. It 
was not the cause of the origin of the event. 
4. Right-of-way maintenance practice  
Tree cutting, to maintain safe distances regarding flashover, is subject to national regulation” (NdA: 
this is to remark that responsibility over the primary cause of the event is stipulated by national 
regulations which look to be inadequate and/or not properly enforced,). 
Source: UCTE [2004a] 
 
A separate issue from investigation on the reasons why the triggering event chain of the blackout 
was inadequately dealt with, is why the Italian system collapsed, once isolated from the UCTE grid, 
and why restoration was so cumbersome. In its final report on the event [AEEG, 2004], the Italian 
authority for Electricity and Gas performs an analysis for what regards the reasons for the Italian 
system collapse and its long restoration:   
 
E4. Missing adoption of the foreseen (i.e., UCTE) countermeasures has resulted in the inefficiency 
of the control logic of the critical sections to defend the integrity of the net in front of cross-border 
interconnections (…) on September 28, 2003, missing adoption of the foreseen countermeasures 
has determined a chain of events which made ineffective the automatic control of the critical section 
Rondissone-Albertville and of the foreign critical section.  
E5. The separation of the national electrical system from the UCTE grid has been characterised by 
phenomena of transient  instability of the Italian electrical system with respect to the UCTE grid. 
E6. As a result of the separation of the national electrical system from the UCTE grid, the spread of 
service interruptions in the national territory has been caused from a series of concurrent events:  
primarily, the anticipated separation of power generation units with respect to the prescribed terms 
and, second, an ineffective reaction of the load separation system  
E7. During the service interruption spread phase the behaviour of 21 power generating groups was 
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patently different from what established in the technical Rules of connection to the national 
transmission grid. 
E8. The whole automatic load shedding action did not comply with the levels established by the 
technical connection Rules. Moreover, several distributors connected with the national transmission 
grid were not equipped with automatic load shedding devices.  
E9. The rate of failure of  the load rejection actions by power generating groups was very high . 
This seriously compromised service restoration. 
E10. In most cases the independent start of the first blackstart units did not take place. The GRTN 
managed the service restoration only through the lines connecting the North to the rest of Italy. This 
caused the remarkable delay of service restoration in the Center and South regions 
E11. During the service restoration phases, the telecommunication systems for remote control of 
manoeuvre of components of the national transmission elements grid endured phenomena of 
instability and saturation. Moreover, the emergency supply system of the above telecommunication 
systems resulted inadequate.(…) From hours 08:00 to hours 14:40, it was impossible to use the 
foretold automatic control system because of lack of supply, due to inadequacy of the emergency 
supply systems of the relevant telecommunication systems.  This required the use of a backup 
satellite telecommunication system and to manually operate the restoration, thus compromising 
ready restoration of service. 
English translation from AEEG [2004] 
 
The degradation of the Italian system and the causes of its long restoration are mostly due to either 
inadequate or inappropriate behaviour of protection equipment. All three categories of   protection 
systems: 
1. critical section control 
2. load relief equipment 
3. load rejection equipment 
failed for different reasons. It is also remarkable that 21 out of 52 power plants failed to compensate 
the lack of imported power, because most of them rejected load well above the stated threshold of 
47.5 hertz. This highlights an important issue: the need to enforce the general rules that determine 
the security of the electric power infrastructure. 
In conclusion, a key concept in power systems defense is the one of critical sections. In Italy, 13 
critical sections were identified by Enel in the 80’s. In case of topological weakness, the criticality 
condition is activated for that section; if, in such condition, another line belonging to that section 
trips, automatic load shedding is activated; this is triggered by opening of the breakers of the 
interconnection lines on the Italian side only. This is why it did not work in the last blackout. 
In practice, each critical system control activates its own load shedding plan. The main drawback of 
such a choice in a highly interconnected grid is that load shedding in one regional area may result 
into unbalancing other areas. For this reason, set up of load shedding thresholds is based on 
sensitivity analysis. After liberalization, this resulted into a considerable drawback, because load 
shedding systems operate on MV distributions, hence they are under jurisdiction of several power 
distribution utilities. Hence the load shedding control scheme was not updated according to up to 
date sensitivity analysis, resulting into system inadequacy. 
According to the Italian grid code, generators have to keep connected for f ≥ 47.5: 21 generators 
(16% of the total generation power) tripped in advance,. Moreover, 8/140 generators only 
succeeded in the load rejection procedure. 
Restoration was made long and cumbersome due to failure of telecommunication equipment, which 
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put most remote control systems out of operation. In turn, this was due to inadequate dimensioning 
of the backup supply of telecom equipment, which granted continuity of operation for 1-2 hours. 
 
 
 
 
Comparison between the US and the Italian blackout 
 
In conclusion, the two major blackouts overviewed show a similar basic pattern: 
1. Multiple interacting contingencies – no single cause; 
2. A low probability event sequence, very difficult to predict; 
3. In both cases, the triggering event was compounded by failures of the monitoring, control 
and protection equipment failed, so that, once the entire cascade of events unfolded, 
operators could not counteract - time was too short. 
However, two important differences are to be remarked as well: 
1. The Italian blackout had a cross border cause in Switzerland. While Italian operators were 
unaware of the mechanics of the event due to the inadequacy of the current UCTE procedure 
for dealing with cross border events, the US case deployment was mostly due to failure of 
the monitoring equipment by the local utility (First Energy) and the system operator (MISO) 
2. In both cases, protection systems failed. However, in the Italian case critical section control 
was basically inadequate to detect the initial failure due to its design, and the load shedding 
plan failed mostly due to inadequate maintenance of its quite sophisticated protection 
scheme and to inappropriate setting of power generators protections (both these causes are 
related,  in turn,  to multi-jurisdictional property of the generation, transmission and 
distribution assets), while in the US case most of the blame was put on the inadequate 
setting of the backup line protection equipment (a much more elementary device than the 
Italian one).   
 
3.4  Control technologies: a prospective view 
In summary, although most ICT infrastructures were reviewed to cope with market liberalisation, 
recent blackouts pointed out several inadequacies, see previous section 3.4. As discussed, 
liberalisation is bringing about higher number and more hectic electricity cross border exchanges, 
while the power grid and its command and control infrastructure have not been substantially 
updated. New control technologies are emerging (adaptive protection systems, dynamic security 
assessment, wide area measurement systems). All these systems are inherently based on collecting 
data in different places, and possibly over an extended period of time, so as to detect an impending 
malfunction affecting a large portion of the overall system, hence they are inherently based on fast 
processing and communication techniques.  
The unstoppable trend towards a tighter integration among power system monitoring, control and 
protection, and business systems, as well as towards increased use of open communication channels 
and off-the-shelf components in those systems, like the TCP/IP protocol and standard operating 
systems (Windows, Linux, SunOS) is likely to further compound the vulnerability of these systems 
in the coming years. Large vertically integrated utilities, such as the former EdF and Enel, used to 
design their own control systems, possibly using proprietary solutions for the ICT infrastructure. As 
this is now either impossible or impractical in most cases due to sector restructuring, new company 
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policies, obvious advantages of off-the-shelf solutions in terms of cost and interoperability, the 
vulnerability of emerging solutions for power controls may be further compounded. 
In the following section, we will present a brief outline of the emerging control technologies, and 
then focus, in a conclusive section, on the vulnerabilities this revision process may bring about. 
 
 System Protection Schemes 
 
Automated systems like Critical Section Control and the Load Shedding Plan discussed in Section 
3.4 pertain to the wide category of the so-called Special or System Protection Schemes (SPS). 
System Protection, as opposed to Equipment Protection, is designed to counteract system-wide 
syndromes, rather than protecting specific equipment from large currents and over-voltages. 
Quite clearly, SPS are inherently based on measurement sampling over wide portions of the grid. 
These data are collected and processed in a central place, so as to recognise whether the system 
inclines towards a dangerous state, and react appropriately. According to the CIGRE` Task Force 
38.02.19 [2001] ”A System Protection Scheme is designed to detect abnormal system conditions and 
take predetermined, corrective action (other than the isolation of faulted elements) to preserve 
system integrity and provide acceptable system performance”. According to [Anderson & Le 
Reverend, 1996] SPS is “… a protection scheme that is designed to detect a particular system 
condition that is known to cause unusual stress to the power system and to take some type of 
predetermined action to counteract the observed condition in a controlled manner. In some cases, 
SPSs are designed to detect a system condition that is known to cause instability, overload, or 
voltage collapse. The action prescribed may require the opening of one or more lines, tripping o 
generators, ramping of HVDC power transfers, intentional shedding of load, or other measures that 
will alleviate the problem of concern. Common types of line or apparatus protection are not 
included in the scope of interest here.” 
Another distinction which is often made in the literature is in between Event-based protections and 
Response or Phenomenon-based protections schemes [Jonsson, 2003]. The latter are inherently 
based on observing the system state over a period of time, so as to detect a system-wide 
perturbation (hence postulate collecting data over that region for that period of time), while the 
former may be based on triggering after a specific event. Line Protections discussed in 3.2 are 
typically event-based, although the concept of Event-based protection may also apply to more 
sophisticated schemes coordinating protections on a local area. In any case, Event-based protections 
react fast, as soon as they detect a triggering condition, like generation rejection or remote load 
shedding initiated by the tripping of a specific transmission line. Response-based systems, like 
under-frequency or under-voltage load shedding are usually decentralised, hence inherently slower, 
but more reliable, as they are insensitive to the failure of a single component. 
Zima [2002] provides a classification of SPSs according to the disturbance they are designed to 
cope with: 
• Under-frequency load shedding devices (UFLS) “are usually triggered when frequency 
sinks to the predefined level and/or with a predefined rate of change. … Their action is 
disconnection of the load in several steps (5 - 20 % each) from the feeders they supervise. 
However, their effective use is strongly dependent on their careful tuning based on pre-
studies, since there is no on-line coordination between them. Another disadvantage is, that 
they can only react to the under frequency, increase of frequency is not covered by them at 
all. In some cases the impact of their operation may be negative, since they are not capable 
of the adaptability to the present situation (e.g. production of distributed/decentralized 
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generation varies in time so quite often the distribution voltage level feeders feed the energy 
back into the network. So they don’t appear as loads and their disconnection makes 
situation even worse).”  This is clearly what happened with the Italian blackout of 
September 2003. 
• Voltage instability is coped with a variety of approaches mostly based on identifying the 
system state against a given model.  The grid in the supervised node may be modelled by its 
Thevenin equivalent and the load by impedance. “The point of equal impedances (rule 
known from the basic circuit theory) is then representing a boundary between stable and 
unstable conditions.”. Other approaches are based on power flow calculations. “When the 
system approaches instability, the solution becomes unfeasible due to the singularity of the 
Jacobian matrix. This provides the basis for a number of indices expressing the proximity to 
voltage collapse” [Berizzi et al., 1996].  Zima [2002] further quotes several other 
approaches based on constraint propagation, continuation power flow, quasi-steady state 
approximation, model predictive control. Most of these methods were developed in the ’90. 
Some are operational and proved their effectiveness. These include control based on simple 
stability indices like the one employed in the Italian grid [Corsi et al., 2000].  
• Large Disturbance Rotor Angle Instability (Transient Instability) is coped with by 
computation of the equal area criterion, expressing a balance between the accelerating and 
the decelerating energy. Application on emergency control has been pioneered in the late 
’90. The angles of the generators are predicted approximately 200 ms ahead. A package 
based on that principle, intended for on-line use, was developed by Powertech Labs and is 
now commercially available [Kundur, 2000]. According to Zima [2002], computation times 
are in the range of 3’-5’ for real size grids (300 nodes). 
• Small Disturbance Rotor Angle Instability is damped in the traditional way by power system 
stabilisers which modulate the output of each generator. However this requires coordinated 
and accurate off-line tuning of these controllers, which is the weak point of  this approach. 
Other approaches are based on the use of FACTS devices. Most recent approaches are based 
on Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS) based on Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). 
According to [CIGRE, 2001] (also quoted by Zima [2002]) the basic requirements about SPS are: 
• Dependability – The certainty that the SPS operates when required, that is, in all cases 
where emergency controls are required to avoid a collapse. 7 
• Security – The certainty that the SPS will not operate when not required, does not apply 
emergency controls unless they are necessary to avoid a collapse.  
• Selectivity – The ability to select the correct and minimum amount action to perform the 
intended function, that is, to avoid using disruptive controls such as load shedding if they 
are not necessary to avoid a collapse.  
• Robustness – The ability of the SPS to provide dependability, security and selectivity over 
the full range of dynamic and steady state operating conditions that it will encounter.  
According to Zima [2002], “The trend is quite obvious; the most SPSs have been commissioned in 
the nineties. The degree of complexity is rapidly increasing and the solutions are more and more 
sophisticated”. He also provides three important statements about the state of the art of SPSs:  
• “All installed SPSs are dedicated solutions for particular power systems. There is no 
scheme that could be applied to another power system with minimal modifications. 
                                                 
7 It is interesting to notice how this source uses Dependability as a synonymous of Reliability as defined according to 
the Electrical Engineering view (see sections 2.1-2.3). 
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• All installed SPSs are either fully or in major part designed and installed by utilities. There 
is no company that would offer a SPS to utilities as a complete solution ranging from data 
acquisition to execution of control actions, except ABB.  
• (…)the costs of the false trips is generally much lower than the cost of failure of the SPS to 
operate when required. This implies, that even with the risk of malfunction, SPS installation 
is economically beneficial/profitable.” 
 
 Wide Area Measurement 
 
As discussed in section 2.2, Dynamic Security assessment includes all methods to evaluate the 
stability of the power system under dynamic conditions. As DSA methods consist of identifying the 
state of the power system against a complex model whose features may lead to combinatorial 
explosion, they may be complemented by any coordinated approach to augmenting the 
observability of the system by taking an additional number of measurements (Wide Area 
Measurement). Most recent approaches to WAM are based on phasor measurement units (PMUs): 
These units provide in real-time GPS-synchronised measurements of voltage and current phasors. 
The technology allows a faster and accurate calculation of active and reactive power flows, based 
on voltage and current phasor measurement, which permits also to carry out modal analysis and 
fault detection and recording. At the same time it permits, through GPS-synchronisation, the 
comparison of absolute angles and the evaluation of relative angles, which puts in evidence stressed 
corridors, voltage instability and collapse margins, frequency instabilities due to network 
separations, angle instability risks between both network areas and single generators with respect to 
the rest of the grid, as represented by its Thevenin equivalent. From a physical viewpoint, phase 
measurements give a way to estimate whether a network area or a single generator is able to deliver 
its power output to the rest of the grid. When this does no longer happen (usually because of a short 
circuit reducing coupling between a generator and the resisting torque of the load) the generator will 
start accelerating until it is damaged (more realistically, until a feedback controller reduces its 
speed), while other generators, having to face an increased load, will conversely reduce speed. 
Comprehensive monitoring of the grid behaviour over time would require instrumentation of all its 
topological nodes. In practice, to reduce cost both of the measurements and of communications, it is 
required to minimise the number of PMUs. This may be achieved by selecting a set of strategically 
placed monitoring buses. Further measurements are then added until the time performance of the 
monitoring system does no longer improve. This way a highly reliable DSA system can be built 
[Kamwa and Grondin, 2002]. Their method applies fuzzy reasoning and Fast Fourier transforms to 
decide at a prescribed time whether a contingency is permanently stable: this way, it is able to 
single out 77% and 91% of all stable cases, respectively within 1 sec. and 2 sec. of the contingency. 
[Kamwa et al., 2003] show that the selected phase measurements monitor the behaviour of specific 
portions of the grid with respect to the system’s center of inertia.  These portions comprise a group 
of generators which will exhibit a similar behaviour, because they are connected to the rest of the 
grid by the same lines, and may be represented by a single equivalent machine[Kamwa et al., 2003], 
[Jonsson, 2003]. 
The above performance means that, although Wide Area Measurements were first introduced in 
power systems as inputs for state estimation, they can be used to implement fast feed back control 
schemes [Bose et al., 2004]. Then a crucial point becomes to compute the delay involved by 
different communication links. Nadhuvathumparambil et al. [2002] show that this is composed of 
three components: 
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• the fixed delay associated to data sampling and computation; 
• the link propagation delay; 
• the ratio between the amount of data transmitted and the data rate of the link. 
Under the realistic assumption of using 10-12 PMUs, 4 bytes per measurements, and 10 input status 
lues (each 2 bytes in length), the fixed delay would amount to 75 ms. For distances between PMUs 
in the range of 200-300 km, the authors show that the overall delay would be in the range of 100-
150 msec for fiber optic cables and digital microwaves, 150-350 with power line communication 
through the grid lines, 200-300 using telephone lines, and 500-700 for satellite links. The paper also 
introduces the IEEE 1344 data format to achieve interoperability among PMUs.  
A key point, however, should be noted: with the current state of communications, if WAMs were to 
be used in a feedback control system, the control logic could not stand far away than 200-300 km. 
from the PMUs. This is fairly different from the current organisation of control in most European 
countries, where overall control is managed by a limited number of control centres, at a distance 
which often exceeds 500 km from the remote terminal units. Hence, adoption of WAM-based 
control would mean to establish an intermediate control level which may not easily fit into the 
current control strategy and organisation. 
In conclusion, WAMs can be used: 
• as monitoring systems, and in that case the key issue is of course how  to interface the 
systems to the human operator so as to make possible a fast appropriate reaction (as 
discussed, after collapse of a major element of the grid, reaction times should be contained 
within a few minutes only);  
• in control loops: in this case however, several issues remain open (the control algorithm 
itself, reliability of communication etc.) before they can be widely adopted. 
 
 
 
 Adaptive relaying  
 
The performances mentioned in the previous section should be compared with the 3rd zone time 
delays in conventional protection systems mentioned in chapter 3.2 (0.4 to 1 sec.). In principle, the 
faster communication links would allow a control system to pre-empt back-up relays of 
conventional protection systems. Actually, off-the-shelf digital protections settings may be changed 
on-line either by a local or a remote controller. As discussed in 3.2, all relay settings are a 
compromise between security and adequacy, i.e. between economy and performance. The principle 
of adaptive relaying is to change adaptively the settings of directional, distance, frequency and other 
relays as the system configuration changes. A quick overview of modern trends in power system 
protections is given by Wilks [2002], where adaptive relaying is defined, according to the classical 
definition by Phadke and Horowitz [1990] as ‘a protective philosophy which permits and seeks to 
make adjustments in various protection functions automatically in order to make them more attuned 
to prevailing power system conditions.’ A more extended bibliography on adaptive relaying, with a 
few practical examples, is provided by [Sidhu and Rosas, 2003]. Applications range from changing 
relay settings, to adapting to a different source impedance configuration, to more sophisticated 
schemes of adaptive protection using neural networks. One of the most debated subjects appears 
how to realise adaptive distance protection, so as to adapt to changing system conditions. However, 
most schemes appear to be based on adaptive algorithms built in the protection’s microprocessor, so 
as to achieve adaptation by measuring system conditions in the protection boundary, rather than 
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relying on a local or wide area scheme, where settings would be changed according to prevailing 
system conditions in a wider region. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present overview outlines how the growing complexity of electrical systems requires robust 
control strategies and innovative/new SCADA. Operational control is moving towards more 
sophisticated control strategies and higher speed, more intelligent local control and protection. 
However, the complexity of the infrastructure to be controlled in the context of progressive 
establishment of a European energy market implies a number of outstanding challenges, which 
were summarized as such in a recent workshop on the emerging security challenges affecting power 
systems [RAmI, 2005]:  
• Need to establish confidence in performances that may be reached with new technologies 
such Wide-Area Monitoring: as discussed in the previous section,   several issues 
specifically concerning technology performance are to be addressed, e.g. criteria for PMU 
positioning, reliability of their  synchronization process, performances of the algorithms, etc. 
• The human factor: one key factor for the blackouts was that current controls rely too much 
on the role of humans, who are fallible and cannot cope with real time constraints. On the 
other hand, humans cannot be removed from the loop, because they are extremely good at 
dealing with unforeseen situations such as those that might arise from malicious attacks. 
Humans should play a more strategic role in supervisory control, while enhancing wherever 
possible fast automated response at a local level.  
• Need to exploit the potential of new technologies for local protection and control: the 
potential of innovative technologies for smart local control at the substation level, like 
adaptive relaying, need to be fully exploited. Their appropriate integration into a multi-
level/multi-area hierarchical control structure must be investigated.  
• Need for non-intrusive technology migration paths: new technologies should come with an 
evolutionary approach to upgrade existing legacy control systems, so as to resolve concerns 
related to communication, resilience, integration of new technologies in the control loop. 
This upgrade is made even more complex because legacy systems are full of bugs, often 
they were developed without any methodology, and their development and support tools are 
outdated. In that context, it is apparent the importance of methodologies to master the life 
cycle of control systems, discussed in section 2.3. 
• Need to address weak areas of the EU grid, especially cross-border ones:  much work has 
to be done regarding decomposition and allocation of control functions especially cross-
border, e.g. Switzerland/France/Italy and France/Spain. Moreover, the legal framework 
among neighbouring countries is very different; hence it is difficult to mandate this task to 
somebody.  
• Ensure resilience of the telecom infrastructure underlying SCADA: next generation systems 
will also require a high performance, secure and high quality service infrastructure, also to 
support flexibility, restore systems and recover data. In that context, cyber vulnerability is 
becoming a major challenge. Distributed control and protection systems, whilst providing 
opportunities for enhanced control and efficiency, also increase the exposure of the power 
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infrastructure to accidental and malicious failures. The fading of boundaries and 
convergence of corporate and control networks also increase the cyber vulnerability of 
control systems.   
 
 
3.5 Resilience of the ICT infrastructure: the role of standards 
This final chapter will deepen on the issue of resilience of ICT introduced in the previous chapter. 
Specifically, we will analyse the role of standards for communication in that perspective:  in fact, 
vulnerabilities due to design and technology flaws may be exploited thanks to the lack of 
appropriate regulations. This threat was perceived by the industry both in the specific sector of 
power system controls and in the process sector at large. However, there is a time gap between the 
availability of standards and their application. The current efforts to consider security in 
communication standards are too recent for being sure about their effectiveness. In the meantime 
the power sector will continue deploying control systems. This opens a negative window of 
opportunity of several years for cyber attacks and failures.  
  
Standards are a key driver in the development of engineering systems in general, and of the power 
sector in particular. Standards, which can impose a certification scheme, constrain the technical 
choices, or harmonize by promoting their voluntary adoption. With reference to ICS and 
specifically to security, standards will be fundamental for the creation of a market and for 
supporting the procurement process. As a consequence, the design and implementation of security 
countermeasures will be facilitated, best available practice can be applied in a consistent way, and 
the risks across the infrastructure can be reduced in a uniform way. 
But, what is the current status of ICT security related standards? Reality is that the production of 
standards is at its early stages. Acknowledgement of their importance is rather new – less that a 
decade old; and awareness of their urgent need if more recent. 
The situation is challenging, and by all accounts will continue to be so for the next decade – if not 
more. Industry is already waiting for standards that will not be ready in the next coming years. In 
the meantime information and communication technologies are being deployed with an ad-hoc 
approach to security, based on the restricted knowledge of each company.  
There is therefore the risk that standards will arrive too late: when some important accidents will 
have happened, and when non-standard and incompatible solutions will be in use. As information 
and communication systems are at the core of the interconnections among the different actors of the 
electric power sector, the delay in the availability of effective standards is by itself another 
vulnerability issue: the near future will see a great window of opportunity for incidents related to 
intentional exploitation of this vulnerability.  
This deficiency has to be dealt with immediately, as any further postponement of clear positions by 
industry and regulators can aggravate the security conditions. The answer to this situation can take 
the form of an intermediate set of guidelines and best-practices to be applied in the transitional 
period until appropriate standards will be complete. This is the approach in North America, with the 
leadership of institutions such as the North America Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and the 
USA’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Similar initiatives would be greatly 
desirable in Europe. 
A further factor that will have to be taken into account is the convergence with telecommunications 
and particularly the work on Internet. Although the electric applications run on top of the 
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communication layers provided, the evolution of the latter will significantly affect the functionality 
and security of the others. Not the least, some other vendors and communities might come from the 
telecommunications and computing networks sector, offering their security solutions and 
constraining the electric power sector choices.  
 
Power Sector Standards and Recommended Practices 
 
The necessity for the consideration of information and network security in the electric power sector 
standards was acknowledged in the late 90’s only. The proprietary and isolated nature of the ICS 
equipment up to those years seemed to require no special provision.  
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is the leading international body for 
electrical, electronic and related technologies.  Its Technical Committee 57 “Power Systems 
Management and Associated Information Exchange” issued the Technical Report TR62210 in May 
2003 discussing the security aspects related to the computerised supervision, control, metering and 
protection in electrical utilities. TC57 recognizes in its Strategic Policy Statement (IEC, 2003) that 
“The fast development of information technology (IT) and communication technology has impact 
on the work of TC57”. A key point of the strategy is to open proprietary structures by 
standardization of data exchange interfaces among IT systems and software applications”.   
The committee collaborates with other organisations making important developments with respect 
to SCADA security, such as the American Gas Association (AGA), the Instrumentation, Systems 
and Automation Society (ISA) and NIST. It is composed of a relevant set of working groups, 
among them: telecontrol protocols, distribution automation, substation communication, application 
program interface for Energy Management Systems, communication for deregulated energy 
markets, interfaces for distribution management systems, interoperability, and especially the 
Working Group 15 data and communication security, launched in October 1999. The dates show 
that the intervention was arriving late with respect to the actual use of insecure remote access 
equipment in the field installations. 
TR 62210 illustrates the risks associated with the typical IEC communication protocols, examining 
some threats, vulnerabilities and potential consequences of electronic intrusions. The document also 
considers some actions and countermeasures that can be applied, and presents a first attempt to 
analyze the risks with a cause-consequence diagram. 
A first lecture of the IEC’s Technical Report (Dondossola, 2004) puts on view some unusual 
elements for Technical Committees dealing with “computerised supervision, control, metering, and 
protection systems in electrical utilities”:  
• It is recognised that information and communication systems security involves the 
“corporate security policy”, which should be the departure point of the so called “Normal 
corporate security process”. But that security policy is not part of the customary practice of 
electric power companies. How many European companies do have an explicit information 
security policy? And if yes, which are the references for the industrial control and 
communications sections? 
• It is recognised the importance to create common vocabulary, as shared notions are the basis 
for standards. Threats, vulnerabilities, information security etc. are not yet stabilised 
notions. 
• It is recognised that vulnerabilities and threats have to be analysed with reference to the 
consequences that might be produced. Some of the consequences suggested point to the 
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broad set of elements that need to be examined: loss of revenue due to increased competition 
or contractual disputes, reduced profitability due to cash flow disturbances, manipulation of 
production and consumption data that leads to erroneous forecasts, artificial change in stock 
value, asset destruction or degradation, etc. In addition it is evident that most of these topics 
fall outside the typical analytic space of engineers, indicating that assessing these 
consequences will not be easy, and will demand suitable methodologies and the 
participation of a considerable staff. 
• It is recognised that the network topology interconnects all actors of the electric power 
system, technical and market-related. The suggested list of stakeholders is ample: obviously 
generation, transmission and distribution companies, but also data aggregators (business 
entities that for instance process and combine metering data), meter service providers, 
electricity suppliers without installations (that operate in the electricity wholesale market), 
risk management market participants (that sell, trade, broker or operate with derivatives in 
the market), and finally the end customers (who expect not just the supply of energy, but 
also information services related to the technical operations, the commercial relations and 
the market). This broad set of actors also point to the potential difficulty of the security 
assessment. 
• The report suggest the employment of a methodology for the assessment (i.e. consequence 
diagrams), that requires the identification of all relevant stakeholders, the business processes 
that concern them, the consequences that can adversely affect those processes, and the 
events that might provoke those consequences. This will serve for ascertaining the threats 
and the vulnerabilities that are of primary importance. If such assessments are to be accepted 
as necessary, it is apparent that much more research in the field and training of personnel 
will be required.  
• The report finally links the identified relevant threats to the specification of the protocols 
developed by the Technical Committee 57, and especially the Telecontrol Application 
Service Element No. 2 (known as TASE.2), and the IEC 61850 and IEC 61334 series 
(respectively devoted to communication networks and systems in substations, and 
distribution automation using distribution line carrier systems). It is proposed to apply the 
standard ISO 15408 (known as Common Criteria, discussed later in this chapter), for the 
generation of Targets of Evaluation (TOE) and Protection Profiles (PP) for the protocols. A 
vast work can be foreseen in the interplay between the specificity of each installation (and 
consequently their own security risk) and the genericity of TOE and PP. The needed 
standards will not be available in a short period. 
The International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE’) convened in 2003 the Joint 
Working Group D2/B3/C3-01, with participation of the Study Committees D2 (Information 
Systems and Telecommunication), B3 (Substations) and C3 (System Environmental Performance). 
Its objective is explicitly the security of the ICS of the electric power systems. The working group 
is producing a series of papers that will undoubtedly serve for raising awareness in the sector. The 
first two papers have been published in the journal Electra (CIGRE, 2005a; CIGRE, 2005b). The 
intention is to present a series of reflections and suggestions of immediate actions that could help in 
bettering the level of ICS security ad the development of proper security policies. 
In North America, NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) has organised a Cyber 
Security Urgent Action, resulting in some guidelines, compliance audits, and activities such as 
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workshops for raising awareness. In 1998 the USA’s Department of Energy assigned to NERC the 
role of co-ordinator of critical infrastructure protection activities reference point for the electric 
power sector, including cyber security. It was created the CIPC (Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Committee) that develops and maintains capabilities to respond to security threats and incidents, 
and supports the production of standards and guidelines. In June 2002, NERC issued the “Security 
Guidelines for the Electricity Sector” that cover physical and cyber security, along with emergency 
plans and business continuity. The approaches and practices recommended are generic, and no 
indications of particular methodologies are given. In any case, the guidelines are useful for 
disseminating common requirements and could act as a basis for further developments.  
NERC’s Cyber Security Urgent Action was set with the purpose to reduce the risks from any 
compromise of critical cyber assets. A first standard (known as Urgent Action Cyber Security 
Standard 1200) was issued in August 2003. It is applicable to control centres only and aimed at self-
certification. The Draft 2 of the last Cyber Security Standards proposed by the NERC Action (CIP-
002-1 through CIP-009-1, formerly known as Urgent Action Cyber Security Standard 1300) was 
issued in August 2003 and is currently under review by the drafting team. It is expected to be 
finished by mid 2005 and applies to control centres, power plants – except nuclear– and substations 
and lists several tasks that are deemed essential for cybersecurity, ranging from security 
management controls, to the identification and definition of critical assets, controls, personnel, and 
functions such as training, systems security management, incident response and recovery plans. But 
it doesn’t consider control system protocols. 
The standard presents detailed metrics. Its importance resides more in its specification of basic 
requirements and measures, and the definition of compliance monitoring processes, levels on on-
compliance and sanctions. This is a language easily understandable by industry and demonstrates a 
significant commitment. This type of approach, although its results will always be far from 
comprehensive, gives an important indication to all players in industry and regulatory bodies: the 
recommendation we can derive is that the problem is serious, basic solutions are urgently needed, 
compliance and enforcement are a must.  
In parallel NERC manages the ES-ISAC (Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center), for the exchange of information on critical risks in the electric power sector. In particular 
two indexes have been developed for indicating the threat levels as well as for indicating the 
possibilities of physical and cyber attacks. These instruments are very helpful for creating alertness 
on the situation, but also a general awareness on the risks. 
 
Other Industrial Control Initiatives 
 
In parallel, IEEE has been producing some standards, such P1547 for “Interconnecting distributed 
resources with Electric Power Systems”, 1525 for substation automation, and 1379 for substation 
IED communication. The IEEE Substations Committee has the task force C0 TF1 that deals with 
Substation Data Security. An open question remains on the multiplicity of efforts for a sector that 
needs promptly answers. 
There are related activities in other industrial sectors that are germane for electric power. In the 
Instrumentation, Systems and Automation Society (ISA), the committee SP99 looks after control 
system security. CIGRE takes part in this initiative. ISA has a standard under development that will 
be issued in the coming years, with a muti-industry focus. Part 1 that aims at the consolidation of 
models, definitions and terminology will be ready by the end of 2005. Part 2, dealing with security 
programs and the analysis of risks and vulnerability will be presented in draft forms in the 
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following months. Part 3 (on Security Programs) and 4 (on Security requirements and controls) will 
only begin their development in the future. There is of course no guarantee that the adopted 
terminology and methodology by ISA, although coherent and efficacious in their context, will not 
enter into conflict with other initiatives. 
The American Petroleum Institute has been working on cyber security guidelines documents and 
API 1164 is the first (published in 2004) dealing with SCADA security best practice. Its goal is to 
provide an easy to follow and rapid guide to industrial companies mainly in the pipeline sector – but 
their applicability is broader. There are no plans for third party certification or requirements on self-
certification. Although incomplete and not very sophisticated from the security viewpoint (for 
instance in the consideration of authentication and access control, links to security policies, etc.), it 
provides ready applicable and sound recommendations. It is therefore a straightforward, practical 
and undemanding effort that, if applied by industry, can have immediate effects. As a provisional 
action while waiting for more thorough measures, it is a lesson to learn by the European electric 
power sector. 
The American Gas Association (AGA) initiated quite early some initiatives in the context of 
infrastructure security. Already in 1988 they had the first discussion in the use of encryption 
protocols to protect the gas sector communications and the SCADA systems. The first technical 
proposals by the Gas Technology Institute (GTI) received scarce attention, due to the lack of 
awareness on the risks. Only after the September 11th 2001 events there was some consciousness 
that specific safeguards were required. The work is conducted by a dedicated working group that 
has delivered the standard report AGA 12 “Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications” 
(Draft 4), issued in November 2004. Although the work is limited to the encryption of 
communications, the working group pointed to the beginning to generic results targeting several 
industries: gas, electric, water, wastewater and pipeline real-time control systems. It should be 
considered that encryption is a valuable solution, but it is first needed to understand the problem: 
the security risks.  
NIST has released in April 2004 a System Protection Profile for Industrial Control. This has been 
developed in the context of the Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF). The 
specification follows the Common Criteria, as a starting point for the specification of security 
requirements. The document extends the typical elements of a Protection Profile (PP) to broaden 
security controls to non-technical procedures and management functions. The PP is generic to all 
kinds of industrial control, focusing in the subset of elements that are applicable to all 
implementations. Very importantly, NIST highlights that security functions should respond to risk 
analyses and dedicated assessments, and that these assessments should be applied to new designs, 
but also for retrofits and upgrades.  
 
General-Purpose Standards  
 
There are two general standards that set the reference framework for all initiatives in information 
security: ISO 17799, the Code of practice for information security management, and the already 
mentioned ISO 15408, the Common Criteria. Both standards provide guidance to security 
management and the specification of security requirements for products, respectively. But they 
don’t demand the application of specific methodologies or technical architectures.  
ISO 17799, derived from the British Standard 7799 and produced by the ISO/IEC Joint Technical 
Committee 1, Subcommittee SC 27, in December 2000, presents a starting point for developing 
organization specific guidance arrangements. It is a “comprehensive set of controls comprising best 
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practices in information security”, and comprises a code of practice and a specification for an 
information security management system. 
A corporation applying it will have to perform a risk assessment, prepare its security resources, and 
prepare the needed elements for certification and compliance. These will include the corporate 
security policy, and the functional and assurance requirements that have to be implemented. The 
standard provides a generic list of these requirements at a high level, independently from specific 
technologies. A fundamental point is the provision of appropriate security policies. A policy should 
set the direction for action and the commitment of the company to information security. Remaining 
at the management level, the application of this standard to industrial installations, mainly one with 
potential critical consequences, seem to merit a review, or at least a complement with particular 
considerations on, for instance, timing issues related to control applications. 
As a single reference point, ISO 17799 is important for providing a common view on administrative 
and industrial information and communication systems. If companies across an industrial sector 
would apply it, the creation of a trusted environment will be fostered.  
The Common Criteria are the result of long developments in the USA, Canada and European 
countries (the Netherlands, France, Germany, United Kingdom), and aimed at supporting the 
specification of products with security requirements. First published in 1996, its second version was 
adopted by ISO as standard 15408 in 1998. The requirements to be defined are functional 
requirements, those related to desired security behaviours, and assurance requirements, which are 
the basis for gaining confidence that the claimed security measures are effective and implemented 
correctly. The standard gives the possibility to select among seven evaluation assurance levels, 
which can be used for grouping components, or provide retrofit compatibility with existing products 
(first 4 levels), or develop specialised components.    
This standard supports purchasers of products in the definition and formulation of the requirements 
they necessitate; vendors or developers in the specification of their products, and third party 
evaluators in the verification and validation of products. In this way, the whole procurement process 
is assisted with common terminology and procedures. 
It is understandable that several approaches to the security of industrial control have taken the 
Common Criteria as reference. However it should be considered that this standard, although 
technically important, has not been heavily applied in the real world. Verifying technical products 
against a standard that comprises functional and assurance procedures is very costly. Some 
significant criticisms are that the evaluations don’t seem to add value while entail notable costs, that 
it doesn’t have a noteworthy impact on the reduction of vulnerabilities, that the engineering efforts 
could be better employed in other technical tasks related to security. 
As a consequence, we can say that the Common Criteria might mature into a useful framework for 
the development and procurements of security devices. Nevertheless, it will take time and will be 
dependent on the evolution of the standard in other fields. In addition, the more immediate needs of 
the electric power sector seem to lie in the system evaluation area – and this is not currently 
supported by the Common Criteria. These will have to evolve, incorporating new assurance 
requirements. 
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4 Conclusions  
This report has provided an overview of the crucial factors involved in most recent huge blackouts, 
and a first analysis of the reasons why existing weaknesses in power system controls could result 
into such dramatic outcomes. Also, it has outlined the gap between the maturity of innovative 
control technologies, and the limitation of present day methodologies for designing and validating 
distributed control systems. If this gap is not reduced, there is little chance that the new advanced 
control schemes will become reality. Awareness of  this challenge was the main motivation for a  
recent workshop on the subject [RAmI, 2005], aimed at fostering discussion among stakeholders 
and the research community on the role of pervasive information & communication technologies 
applied to power systems. The conclusions of this report are largely based on the outcomes of this 
workshop.  
One has to consider that the organizational and technological evolution of electric power systems 
occurs within a broader landscape. The drivers shaping the space where the electric power 
infrastructure develops are: 
• technology is becoming more and more the fabric of our society; 
• stronger integration of control and communication, more homogeneous control and 
communication protocols; 
• fading of boundaries, convergence of business and control functions in corporate networks; 
• all services to be delivered through similar channels and interdependent among them. 
More specifically, all new power system controls are likely to make growing use of open ICT 
infrastructures and off-the-shelf hardware and software components. The market brings about 
growing standardisation of ICT components and services:  
• almost all off-the-shelf remote control systems use the IP protocol; 
• the market provides standard remote control solutions to the whole process sector 
independent from the specific domain (electric power, oil and gas, chemicals etc.); 
• local area off-the-shelf solutions (eg Bluetooth, WiFi) may also be very vulnerable: 
• the adoption of off-the-shelf standard solutions and transformation of ICT infrastructures in 
multi-jurisdictional systems (open to a user community extended across national 
boundaries) largely compounds their vulnerability. 
In summary, the main challenges and concerns that review of power systems control is bringing 
about appear to be related to: 
1. The applicability and the impact of advanced control and communication technologies 
on the overall architecture of power control systems: although there is consensus about 
the key role that emerging technologies like WAMS and innovative protection schemes in 
the future controls of electrical networks, several issues remain to be resolved concerning 
integration with legacy systems, better and faster communications to support flexibility and 
quality of service, resilience against security threats, and the methods to prove and verify 
new control applications. 
2. The need to cope with more threats and vulnerabilities: Designers have to cope with 
more uncertainty in a competitive environment, which causes that considerable amount of 
knowledge and data is not shared. Moreover, we have to face new types of threats (e.g. 
malicious attacks) and vulnerabilities (e.g. uncertainty about data and components 
behaviours) that are hard to model. Cyber vulnerability is becoming a major challenge. 
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Distributed control and protection systems connected to global supervision networks by 
means of Internet technologies, whilst providing opportunities for enhanced control and 
efficiency, also increase the exposure of the power infrastructure to accidental and malicious 
failures. We need to identify and monitor attacks against control systems as well as to 
integrate e-attacks into risk assessment. 
3. The move from dedicated to off-the-shelf systems: the use of COTS will increase the 
likelihood of malfunctions and unexpected behaviours of components in the control loop. 
4. The need to cope with distributed generation and renewables: the amount of distributed 
generation will increase and the mix among power sources will spread. This is a further 
factor requiring more flexible and distributed future controls. 
In the current situation, where the system can hardly be strengthened by making recourse to 
physical measures (it is rather hard to build more transmission lines, or to further decentralise 
power generation due to their growing environmental impact). As it is not reasonable nor 
envisageable to keep a centralised model of power system expansion in order to cope with demand 
growth, there is an absolute need for distributed intelligence, that would ultimately reduce the 
growing complexity of the system. In turn, this requires robust control strategies and 
innovative/new SCADA. Operational control should move towards higher speed, more intelligent 
local control and protection. We need to make the system more ductile and self-reconfigurable. We 
need to decentralise and distribute intelligence (distributed state estimators, distributed generators, 
adaptive architecture, agent-based estimation). We need to capture, reuse and correlate knowledge 
and diversity of information, which also involves using different lines of reasoning. More run-time 
checking, verification and data analysis shall help understanding how to distribute intelligence and 
enhance controllability. On the other hand, this transition towards innovative control strategies and 
systems needs to be smooth and evolutionary, so as to take into account the legacy of existing 
control architectures and currently deployed systems.  
A further facet of the above concerns the integration of heterogeneous simulation tools (e.g. 
dynamic security assessment; discrete runtime models of control& communication) into 
transmission and distribution grid operation, so as to progress towards understanding how ICT 
interact with electrical grids. This will also allow the development of more sophisticated control 
strategies, able to adapt to changing requirements, and anticipate threats, based on symptoms and 
real time indicators.  
Also, there is a need to establish confidence in performances that may be reached with new 
technologies such as WAMS: (e.g. technology performance, criteria for PMU positioning 
performances of the algorithms, etc.). 
This scenario involves a number of purely methodological issues which can be summarized in the 
following list: 
− Trade-offs of using formal methods: present day design methodologies relying on formal 
methods appear too cumbersome and complex to be useful in the design of very large 
systems. Also, the complexity of power systems is such that the use of heuristic methods is 
often unavoidable. 
− Need for non-intrusive technology migration paths: new technologies should come with an 
evolutionary approach to upgrade existing legacy control systems, so as to resolve concerns 
related to communication, resilience, ways to integrate new technologies in the control loop. 
These issues appear to require a joint effort of stakeholders (transmission system operators, 
utilities) and technology providers. 
− Ensure resilience of the telecom infrastructure underlying SCADA: next generation systems 
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will also require a high performance, secure and high quality service infrastructure, also to 
support flexibility, restore systems and recover data. 
− Identification and modelling: the immediate challenges for the research and industrial 
communities are: identifying first key vulnerabilities and controls, followed by models and 
measurements and development of methodologies and tools. The problem of interplay 
among infrastructures must be solved, which might benefit from the application of complex 
systems principles, and complexity theories might help to improve controllability and self-
healing. In addition, new methods for testing and reviews must be found. 
− Assessment of vulnerabilities, threats and risk: The subject is new for power systems and 
pressing because installations of many ICT systems are being made today without a 
thorough consideration of the security implications. It is not clear which could be the 
appropriate (feasible, affordable, efficient) ways for identifying and analysing vulnerabilities 
and threats, and therefore to evaluate the cyber risks to which it is subject the electricity 
system, in a context where boundaries are fading (between control & communication, 
business & control etc.).  
Furthermore, the above scenario is made more complex by a number of issues having mostly a 
political and socio-economic nature. Among them we must mention: 
− How to deal with legacy systems: Legacy systems are full of bugs, often they were 
developed without any methodology, and their development and support tools are outdated. 
However, the cost of their replacement is very high and industry does not have a very strong 
incentive to proceed with this replacement. 
− The cost of security: same predicament applies to the other challenges discussed (e.g. use of 
COTS, uncertainty, emerging vulnerabilities). The cost of security is high and it is not clear 
to which extent society is prepared to bear it.8 There is a need to accurately assess the 
benefits of security investment in the power sector. 
− The human factor: one aspect of current controls is that they rely too much on the role of 
humans, who are fallible and cannot cope with real time constraints as well as stressful 
situations. Are we prepared to remove humans from the loop? On the other hand, humans 
are extremely good at dealing with unforeseen situations such as those that might arise from 
malicious attacks. We must understand how to use local control & local intelligence for 
global control, at a higher system level, so as to provide different and informative views of 
the same system. This will allow assigning to humans a more strategic role in supervisory 
control, while enhancing wherever possible fast automated response at al local level.  
− Need to address weak areas of the EU grid, especially cross-border ones:  much work has 
to be done regarding decomposition and allocation of control functions especially cross-
border, e.g. Switzerland/France/Italy and France/Spain: there is a need for more R&D on 
decomposition and allocation of security control capabilities in particular in the boundaries 
of networks, and more algorithms for data exchange/sharing across boundaries. However, 
the legal framework among neighbouring countries is very different; hence it is difficult to 
mandate this task to somebody. Concerning security of supply, there is a ‘grey area’ 
between the EU and the member states. 
− How to overcome the economically-biased control: system security and adequacy is a public 
good. Access to services must be granted on an equal basis, also to peripheral and isolated 
                                                 
8 Several authors argue that the society cannot cope with the cost of keeping the current security levels of power 
systems (see Amin, [2005] for the current debate on this issue in the USA). 
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areas. In view of this, control policies cannot be purely based on economic criteria, even in a 
competitive market. 
− Risks associated to the spread of monoculture: stronger integration between control & 
communication, fading of boundaries and convergence of corporate and control networks 
increase the cyber vulnerability of control systems.  A way ahead in that respect may be the 
usage of transparent “honey nets” able to capture intruders and classify attack patterns 
against SCADA and control systems. 
− Role of standards:  vulnerabilities due to design and technology flaws may be exploited 
thanks to the lack of appropriate regulations. But there is a time gap between the availability 
of standards and their application. The current efforts to consider security in EPS-related 
standards are too recent for being sure about their effectiveness. In the meantime industry 
will continue deploying cyber systems. This opens a negative window of opportunity of 
several years for cyber attacks and failures. There is an urgent need to act for overcoming 
this situation, and R&D should support.  
− Competence and proper training are required. Personnel are frequently not sufficiently 
qualified to cope with the more critical events, especially when dealing with diagnosis and 
recovery actions in emergency situations. There is a need to enforce continuous training, 
even by law.  
In conclusion, Security must be seen as a systemic property: the top challenge is to understand and 
accept the risk, in particular for interconnected infrastructures. Security cannot be ensured by local 
measures; it must be taken into account in all phases of the life cycle of a system, from requirement 
analysis to design, runtime control implementation, verification and testing, and must apply to all 
system components. 
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Mission 
 
The mission of the Institute of the Protection and Security of the Citizen of the Joint Research 
Centre is to provide research-based, system-oriented support to EU policies so as to protect the 
citizen. The main application areas are cyber-security and the fight against fraud; natural, 
technological and economic risks; humanitarian security, non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards. 
The Institute will continue to maintain and develop its expertise in information, communication, 
space and engineering technologies in support of its mission. 
 
 
 
